


The Bay Area Homeland Security Strategy 2012 – 2014



January 2012

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BAY AREA HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

Homeland Security is the coordinated effort to ensure the entire Bay Area region is prepared to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to and recover from threats and acts of terrorism and other man-made or natural catastrophes. It requires a risk management process in order to ensure we have the right capabilities in place to manage those hazards that pose the greatest risk to the Bay Area, its people, and its critical infrastructure and key resources. The threat of catastrophic events, both natural and man-made, requires continuous attention and strategic commitment from all levels of government, the private sector and the general public. The Bay Area is committed to this effort. Working together, the entire Bay Area has strived to integrate preparedness activities, especially preparedness planning at the strategic level. This homeland security strategy represents the latest effort in that regard.

Purpose

The purpose of the Bay Area Homeland Security Strategy (Bay Area Strategy or Strategy) is to ensure the Bay Area region has a comprehensive document and system that outlines the region's risks, capabilities, vision, structure, goals and objectives for homeland security. Having such a Strategy will ensure the Bay Area is in the best possible position to clearly track and articulate its risk and capability needs to local leaders, the State of California and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) when seeking resources and funding to enhance homeland security and public safety across the region. The Strategy is designed primarily to address terrorism risk faced by the Bay Area with an understanding that capabilities enhanced to combat terrorism often enhance the ability to also manage natural disasters, such as earthquakes, and man-made accidents, such as hazardous materials spills.

The Strategy outlines a comprehensive system for enhancing regional capability and capacity that will guide the Bay Area's efforts to:

- Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks;
- Protect the people of the Bay Area, its critical infrastructure and key resources;
- Mitigate the damage caused by acts of terrorism, natural disasters and man-made accidents;
- Respond to and recover from major incidents and all hazards that do occur;
- Continue to strengthen our preparedness foundation to ensure our long-term success; and
- Guide future investments, increase capabilities and reduce risk.

Vision

The Bay Area's vision for homeland security is a secure, prepared and resilient region consistently developing regional capabilities based on an analysis of risk through collaboration and coordination.

Jurisdiction Description

In 2006, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) combined the three previously independent jurisdictions of Oakland, San Francisco, and San Jose under the DHS Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) grant program into the current Bay Area UASI. The UASI program provides financial assistance to address the unique multi-discipline planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercise needs of high-threat, high-density Urban Areas, and assists those Urban Areas with supplemental funding to build and sustain capabilities to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from threats or acts of terrorism and other major hazards.

The current Bay Area UASI region is comprised of twelve counties (Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Solano, Sonoma, Monterey and San Benito) and the three major cities of Oakland, San Francisco, and San Jose.¹ In 2005, prior to the DHS led consolidation, this group initiated regional planning and collaboration efforts by developing the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP).

The Bay Area UASI is inclusive of over 100 incorporated cities and a combined total population exceeding 7.5 million people. In addition to the 7.5 million residents, the Bay Area attracts 15.9 million visitors annually who spend more than \$16.6 million per day in the region. The Bay Area is one of the most culturally diverse areas in California.

Risk Overview

Threat assessment data indicates that the Bay Area is home to many international and domestic terrorist organizations, making it a prime location for potential terrorist attack. The Bay Area is particularly at risk for vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks, e.g., car or truck bombings against critical infrastructure. The relatively high likelihood of a VBIED attack in the Bay Area is driven by the ease and low expense of carrying out such an attack. Such a method of attack is common around the world.

The Bay Area is also vulnerable to natural disasters, especially floods, earthquakes and wildfires. The region rests upon one of the longest and most active earthquake fault systems in the world. This system includes the San Andreas Fault, the Hayward Fault and the Calaveras Fault. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates an 80% chance of a magnitude 6.7 or greater quake striking the Bay Area within the next 30 years. Based on the Bay Area's topography, risk from wild land fires as well as tsunamis are also of major concern.

¹The California Emergency Management Agency (CalEMA) divides the state's 58 counties into 3 administrative regions: Coastal, Inland, and Southern. The Bay Area UASI is part of the Coastal Region which includes: law, fire, coroners/medical examiners, emergency medical, and search and rescue mutual aid systems.

To address the myriad of risks faced by the Bay Area region, the Strategy will be governed by the principal of risk management. Resources will be allocated where the greatest risk, the greatest need, and the greatest return on investment can be demonstrated.

Urban Area Structure

The Bay Area UASI is managed through a three-tiered governance structure. The top tier is the eleven-member Approval Authority that includes representation from each of the three major cities of Oakland, San Francisco, and San Jose and the County of Alameda, County of Contra Costa, County of Marin, County of Monterey, County of San Francisco, County of San Mateo, County of Santa Clara and County of Sonoma. An appointee from the Secretary of CalEMA is also a non-voting member. The Approval Authority provides policy direction to the program and is responsible for final decisions.


The eleven-member Approval Authority works collaboratively with an Advisory Group which acts as the second tier of the governance structure. Advisory Group members include one representative each from the twelve Bay Area county operational areas, the three major cities, the regional fusion center and an appointee from the Secretary of CalEMA. The Advisory Group makes policy and programmatic recommendations to the Approval Authority and ensures there is broad representation, input and participation in the regional planning process.

Managing the day-to-day work of the Bay Area UASI is a Management Team comprised of a general manager, strategy and compliance director, project managers, finance and grants managers. The City and County of San Francisco has been designated as the fiscal agent for the grants managed by the Bay Area UASI.

Strategy Development Process

Through a series of meetings and other planning activities within the region, the Strategy and its goals and objectives as well as various ideas and recommendations were developed. The planning process used to develop the Strategy is outlined below. This process included a regional risk assessment, a capabilities assessment and a gap analysis. From that data, strategic goals and objectives were developed along with implementation steps that track the capabilities-based planning model, whereby each objective is implemented through a series of resource elements divided among the elements of capability: plans, organization, equipment, training and exercises (POETE) as outlined in the figure below entitled “Bay Area Strategy Development Process.”

Bay Area Strategy Development Process



Regional, State and National Goals

The Strategy is built on the premise that achieving homeland security is an ongoing mission and one that must be a shared responsibility across the entire region, state and nation. This includes our local, tribal, state, and federal agencies, international partners, community organizations, businesses and individuals. Therefore, the Strategy supports implementation of the State of California Homeland Security Strategy and the National Security Strategy. Indeed, this Strategy serves as the Bay Area's focal point in implementing not only local and regional homeland security policy and priorities, but also national and state homeland security policy at the local and regional level.

Summary of Goals and Objectives

Each of the Bay Area's strategic goals seeks to align whenever possible with either a National or State homeland security priority and each objective with the Federal Target Capabilities List from the DHS National Preparedness Guidelines. The Target Capabilities List is a list of 37 capabilities, ranging from intelligence analysis to search and rescue; all of which are needed to implement and achieve the National Homeland Security Priorities. The National Homeland Security Priorities represent broad and thematic goals that the Nation should strive to achieve in homeland security. The National Homeland Security Priorities are:

The National Homeland Security Priorities
Implement the National Incident Management System and the National Response Framework
Implement the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
Expand Regional Collaboration
Strengthen Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) Detection, Response and Decontamination Capabilities
Strengthen Information Sharing and Collaboration Capabilities
Strengthen Interoperable and Operable Communications Capabilities
Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness
Strengthen Medical Surge and Mass Prophylaxis Capabilities

The purpose of aligning each objective to a Target Capability is to ensure the Strategy drives investments centered on enhancing specifically defined capabilities needed to better secure and protect the Bay Area from those acts of terrorism and other major hazards that pose the greatest risk to the region. In the end, the Bay Area's ability to prevent acts of terrorism or respond effectively to major natural disasters, such as a catastrophic earthquake, will be determined by the region having sufficient capabilities in place to deal with those threats and hazards. Building and sustaining those capabilities takes time and constant focus with the Strategy's goals, objectives and implementation steps outlining in detail what the Bay Area needs to do to make sure it achieves and sustains those capabilities.

The goals and objectives are directed towards the next three years and will be reviewed and updated annually. It is likely that some of the objectives will carry over from year to year while others may be removed or updated based on the region's progress and actual needs. The goals and objectives will continue to be defined by risk analysis, identified preparedness gaps and sustainment priorities.

A summary of the Bay Area's goals and objectives is set forth below.

Goal 1 Develop a Regional Risk Management and Planning Program

Target Capability	Bay Area Objective
Risk Management Planning	1.1: The Bay Area will identify and assess risks, prioritize and select appropriate plans, solutions and investments based on risk reduction, and monitor the outcomes of risk based funding allocation decisions.

Goal 2 Enhance Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Capabilities

Target Capability	Bay Area Objective
Counter-Terrorism Investigations and Law Enforcement	2.1: The Bay Area law enforcement community will ensure that suspects involved in criminal activities related to homeland security are successfully identified, deterred, detected, disrupted, investigated, and apprehended.
Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings	2.2: The Bay Area will identify and systematically report suspicious activities or circumstances associated with potential terrorist or criminal pre-operational planning for vetting and review and operational follow-up by the appropriate authorities.
Intelligence Analysis and Production	2.3: The Bay Area will sustain and build upon its multidisciplinary, all-source information/intelligence fusion center, in order to produce timely, accurate, clear and actionable intelligence/information products in support of regional prevention, awareness, deterrence, response and public safety operations.
Intelligence Information Sharing and Dissemination	2.4: The Bay Area will develop and sustain systems and procedures to effectively and timely share information and intelligence across Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, regional, and private sector entities within the Bay Area to achieve coordinated awareness of, prevention of, protection against, mitigation of, and response to a threatened or actual terrorist attack, major disaster, or other emergency.
Critical Infrastructure Protection	2.5: The Bay Area will assess the risk to the region's critical infrastructure and key resources from acts of terrorism and natural hazards and deploy a suite of actions to enhance protection and reduce the vulnerability of the region's critical infrastructure and key resources from all hazards.

Goal 3 Strengthen Communications Capabilities

Target Capability	Bay Area Objective
Communications	3.1: The emergency response community in the Bay Area will have the ability to provide a continuous flow of mission critical voice, data and imagery/video information among multi-jurisdictional and multidisciplinary emergency responders, command posts, agencies, and Bay Area governmental officials for the duration of an emergency response operation.

Goal 4 Strengthen CBRNE Detection, Response, and Decontamination Capabilities

Target Capability	Bay Area Objective
Fire Incident Response Support	4.1: Fire service agencies across the Bay Area will dispatch initial fire suppression resources within jurisdictional response time objectives, and firefighting activities will be conducted safely with fire hazards contained, controlled, extinguished, and investigated, with the incident managed in accordance with local and state response plans and procedures.
Search and Rescue	4.2: Search and rescue operations in the Bay Area will be conducted to rescue and transfer the greatest number of victims (human and, to the extent that no humans remain endangered, animal) to medical or mass care capabilities, in the shortest amount of time, while maintaining rescuer safety.
CBRNE Detection	4.3: The Bay Area will develop systems and procedures to rapidly detect and identify chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and/or explosive (CBRNE) materials at ports of entry, critical infrastructure locations, public events, and incidents and communicate CBRNE detection and warning information to appropriate entities and authorities across the State and at the Federal level.
Explosive Device Response Operations	4.4: Public safety bomb squads across the Bay Area will build and sustain capabilities to provide on-scene threat assessments, and the explosive and/or hazardous devices will be located and rendered safe, and the area cleared of hazards.
Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution	4.5: The Bay Area will develop a system to track and manage critical resources and make them available to incident managers and emergency responders from across the Bay Area upon their coordinated request for proper distribution to enhance emergency response operations and aid disaster victims in a cost-effective and timely manner.
WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination	4.6: Hazardous materials teams across the Bay Area will build and sustain capabilities to rapidly identify and mitigate the effects of a hazardous materials release through victim rescue, decontamination and treatment and effectively protect responders and at-risk populations.
On-site Incident Management	4.7: The Bay Area will develop and sustain a fully integrated response system through a common framework of the Incident Command System and Unified Command including the use of incident action plans and the tracking of on-site resources in order to manage major incidents safely, effectively and efficiently.
Responder Safety and Health	4.8: The Bay Area will strive to reduce the risk of illnesses or injury to any Bay Area first responder, first receiver, medical facility staff member, or other skilled support personnel as a result of preventable exposure to secondary trauma, chemical/radiological release, infectious disease, or physical/emotional stress after the initial incident or during decontamination and incident follow-up.

Emergency Public Safety and Security Response	4.9: Public safety agencies within the Bay Area will be able to keep the public and critical infrastructure safe by securing a particular incident scene and maintaining law and order following an incident or emergency to include managing the criminal justice prisoner population.
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Goal 5 Enhance Medical, Public Health and Mass Care Preparedness

Target Capability	Bay Area Objective
Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment	5.1: Emergency medical services (EMS) resources across the Bay Area will effectively and appropriately be dispatched to provide pre-hospital triage, treatment, transport, tracking of patients, and documentation of care appropriate for the incident, while maintaining the capabilities of the EMS system for continued operations up to and including for mass casualty incidents.
Medical Surge	5.2: Those injured or ill from a medical disaster and/or mass casualty event in the Bay Area will rapidly and appropriately be cared for. Continuity of care will be maintained for non-incident related illness or injury.
Mass Prophylaxis	5.3: With the onset of an event, appropriate drug prophylaxis and vaccination strategies will be implemented across the Bay Area in a timely manner to prevent the development of disease in exposed individuals. Public information strategies will include recommendations on specific actions individuals can take to protect their family, friends, and themselves.
Medical Supplies Management and Distribution	5.4: Critical medical supplies and equipment in the Bay Area will be appropriately secured, managed and distributed to field responders and providers, and then restocked in a timeframe appropriate to the incident and according to plan(s).
Isolation and Quarantine	5.5: Individuals in the Bay Area who are ill, exposed, or likely to be exposed will be separated and their health monitored in order to limit the spread of a newly introduced contagious disease (e.g., pandemic influenza). Legal authority for those measures will be clearly defined and communicated to all responding agencies and the public.
Laboratory Testing	5.6: Potential exposure to disease in the Bay Area will be identified rapidly by determining exposure and mode of transmission and agent. Confirmed cases and laboratory results will be reported immediately to all relevant public health, food regulatory, environmental regulatory, and law enforcement agencies in support of operations and investigations.
Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation	5.7: Potential exposure to disease in the Bay Area will be identified rapidly by determining exposure and mode of transmission and agent followed by the issuance and implementation of control measures to contain the spread of the event, thereby reducing the number of cases.

Fatality Management	5.8: The Bay will effectively document, recover and dispose of human remains and items of property and evidence following a disaster.
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Goal 6 Strengthen Emergency Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities

Target Capability	Bay Area Objective
EOC Management	6.1: Emergency operations centers (EOCs) across the Bay Area will function in accordance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS), emergency plans and standard operating procedures. EOCs will effectively plan, direct and coordinate information and activities internally within EOC functions, and externally with other multi-agency coordination entities, command posts and other public information to effectively coordinate disaster response operations.
Emergency Public Information and Warning	6.2: The Bay Area will develop an integrated system of systems involving government agencies, the general public, and the private sector that allows for the transmission of clear, specific, accurate, certain and consistent alerts and warnings to all appropriate recipients through Joint Information Centers, or other means, regarding threats to health, safety, and property.
Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place	6.3: Affected and at-risk populations, to include access and functional needs populations, in the Bay Area will be safely sheltered-in-place or evacuated to safe refuge areas and eventually returned home when safe and feasible.
Mass Care	6.4: Mass care services, including sheltering, feeding, and bulk distribution, will be rapidly, effectively and efficiently provided for the population, including those with access and functional needs.
Community Preparedness and Participation	6.5: The Bay Area will build and sustain a formal structure and process for ongoing collaboration between government and nongovernmental resources at all levels to prevent, protect/mitigate, prepare for, respond to and recover from all threats and hazards.
Volunteer Management and Donations	6.6: Volunteers and donations within the Bay Area will be organized and managed throughout an emergency based upon pre-designated plans, procedures and systems.

Goal 7 Enhance Recovery Capabilities	
Target Capability	Bay Area Objective
Structural Damage Assessment	7.1: The Bay Area will provide accurate situation needs and damage assessments by utilizing the full range of engineering, building inspection, and code enforcement services in a way that maximizes the use of resources, aids emergency response, implements recovery operations, and restores the affected area to pre-event conditions as quickly as possible.
Economic and Community Recovery	7.2: During and following a disaster, the Bay Area will estimate economic impact, prioritize recovery activities, minimize business disruption, and provide individuals and families with appropriate levels and types of relief with minimal delay.
Environmental Health	7.3: After the primary disaster event, disease and injury will be prevented across the Bay Area through the quick identification of associated environmental hazards, including debris and hazardous waste.
Restoration of Lifelines	7.4: The Bay Area will coordinate activities between lifeline operations and government operations to include a process for getting the appropriate personnel and equipment to the disaster scene so that lifelines can be restored as quickly and as safely as possible.

Goal 8 Enhance Homeland Security Exercise, Evaluation and Training Programs	
Target Capability	Bay Area Objective
All Relevant Capabilities	8.1: The Bay Area exercise program will test and evaluate the region's enhancement and/or sustainment of the right level of capability based on the risks faced by the region with an evaluation process that feeds identified capability gaps and strengths directly into the region's risk management and planning process for remediation or sustainment.
All Relevant Capabilities	8.2: The Bay Area will have a multi-discipline, multi-jurisdictional risk and capabilities based training program that enhances and sustains priority capabilities in order to mitigate the region's most pressing risks.

Strategy Execution

The Bay Area UASI Management Team will have overall responsibility for managing and tracking implementation of the Strategy with the UASI Management Team's Director of Strategy and Grant Compliance serving as the executive agent for that function. Implementation will occur through major annual investments and projects developed at the city, county/operational area, sub-regional and regional level.

The region's annual planning and investment guidance will outline basic planning structures and priorities to ensure the Bay Area is executing the strategy through investments. This will include

planning timelines, grant guidance, project templates and such other materials and policies as may be necessary to ensure a seamless and integrated planning structure and system. Beginning in 2012, as federal homeland security funding assistance dissipates; the Bay Area will pay particular attention to sustaining the capability gains it has already made over the years.


Evaluation of the Strategy

In order to truly understand the value of the Bay Area's homeland security investments, the region must have a consistent mechanism by which to measure the effectiveness of the homeland security activities generated (i.e., what plans were developed, personnel hired, organization and operations conducted, equipment purchased, number of people trained, and exercises conducted, etc.) by those investments. This will be done in the form of an effectiveness report to the Advisory Group and Approval Authority.²

Based on its goals and objective, this Strategy outlines the region's approach to homeland security. The effectiveness report outlines where it is in achieving those goals and objectives and is based on enhancing capabilities tied to risk management. This evaluation process will integrate with and support the State of California Metrics Project, which seeks to similarly measure the effectiveness of homeland security investments and capability levels across the state, as well as the DHS-mandated State Preparedness Report (SPR) and the SPR survey tool.

² In 2011, the Bay Area produced a preliminary UASI effectiveness report, which examined certain UASI investments to determine if the region had been following its strategic plans over the years and investing in priority, risk based capabilities. The overall findings showed the region had been investing according to its plans and that priority capabilities had been enhanced. The full report can be found at *Preliminary Report on UASI Grant Effectiveness in the Bay Area* (June 2011).

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The Bay Area Homeland Security Strategy and Implementation Plan

January 2012

SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

Homeland Security is the coordinated effort to ensure we are prepared to prevent, protect against, respond to and recover from threats and acts of terrorism and other man-made or natural catastrophes. It requires a risk management process in order to ensure we have the right capabilities in place to manage those hazards that pose the greatest risk to the region, its people, and its critical infrastructure and key resources. The threat of catastrophic events, both natural and man-made, requires continuous attention and strategic commitment from all levels of government, the private sector and the general public.

The Northern California Bay Area is a major target of terrorist organizations and a region with an extensive history of natural disasters. To better address these risks on a regional basis, in 2006, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) combined three previously independent Urban Areas (Oakland, San Francisco, and San Jose) under the DHS Urban Area Security Initiative grant program and formed the Northern California Bay Area Urban Areas Security Initiative (Bay Area UASI) region for preparedness purposes.

The combining of the three previously independent Urban Areas prompted them to review their existing governance structures. As a result, the Bay Area UASI established a new three-tiered governance structure, which included the major cities of Oakland, San Francisco, and San Jose, the ten county operational areas, and the State of California Emergency Management Agency. This governance structure is designed to ensure integration and coordination among the diverse members of the region as each works to collectively enhance the region's preparedness and security. In 2011, the Bay Area UASI Approval Authority decided to expand its footprint by two county operational areas to enhance its regional collaboration and coordination capabilities.

The Bay Area UASI is committed to the homeland security effort. Working together, the entire Bay Area UASI has strived to integrate preparedness activities, especially preparedness planning at the strategic level. This homeland security strategy represents the latest effort in that regard. The Bay Area UASI is a recognized leader in homeland security and has made great strides in improving preparedness and security while maintaining our standards of freedom and civil liberties. We will build on our accomplishments, but must remain vigilant and continue to meet the challenges going forward.

SECTION 2

PURPOSE

2.1 Purpose Overview

The purpose of the Bay Area Homeland Security Strategy is to ensure the Bay Area has a comprehensive, data driven document that outlines the Bay Area's risks, capabilities, vision, structure, goals and objectives for homeland security. Having such a document will ensure the Bay Area is in the best possible position to clearly track and articulate its risk and capability needs to local leaders, the State of California and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) when seeking resources to reduce that risk and satisfy those capability needs. The Strategy is designed primarily to address terrorism risk with an understanding that capabilities enhanced to combat terrorism often enhance the ability to also manage natural disasters and man-made accidents.

The Strategy outlines a comprehensive system for enhancing regional capability and capacity that will guide the Bay Area UASI's efforts to:

- Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks;
- Protect the people of the Bay Area, its critical infrastructure and key resources;
- Mitigate the damage caused by acts of terrorism, natural disasters and man-made accidents;
- Respond to and recover from major incidents and all hazards that do occur;
- Continue to strengthen our preparedness foundation to ensure our long-term success; and
- Guide future investments, increase capabilities and reduce risk.

This is an exceedingly complex mission requiring coordination, cooperation, collaboration, and focused effort from the entire region – residents, government, as well as the private and non-governmental organization sectors. The Bay Area region will apply the resources available from DHS to address unique planning, organizational, equipment, training, and exercise needs to assist in building an enhanced and sustainable capacity to prepare for all hazards. However, this Strategy is not a grant strategy; it is a comprehensive homeland security strategy that will be implemented through projects funded by Federal grants, general funds and such other funding opportunities that may become available.

2.2 Prior and Ongoing Planning Efforts

Prior to the 2006 consolidation of the three previously independent Urban Areas, the initial homeland security strategies were developed based upon the September 2003 regional assessments. That process included comprehensive risk, capabilities, and needs assessments. The results of the assessments provided an early insight into the requirements of each of the three Urban Areas at the time. The three strategies were revised in 2005 to align with the homeland security mission areas of prevention, protection, response and recovery, and the Target Capabilities List to enable the region to more effectively embrace the capabilities based planning process. Later, a regional strategy was developed in accordance with the consolidation of 2006. The 2006 Strategy was followed by a new 2010 Bay Area regional homeland security strategy

based upon a region-wide risk and capabilities assessment conducted in late 2009. The 2010 Bay Area Strategy served as a baseline for this current 2012 Bay Area Homeland Security Strategy.

In the past, the Bay Area region has conducted assessments and developed several strategic, operational and tactical level plans that have produced valuable data to help drive the region's policies and programs. Those assessments and strategies (and future assessments and strategies) serve two purposes concerning this Strategy: first, they provide valuable data and strategic input into this regional Strategy; and second, they serve as implementation plans, policies and procedures under the umbrella of this larger region-wide Bay Area Homeland Security Strategy. Appendix A outlines this interrelated planning structure.

In 2008, the Bay Area UASI produced five major planning guidance documents: an assessment and strategic plan for regional interoperable communications; an assessment and project plan for community preparedness; a gap analysis and multi-year training and exercise program for EMS, the fire service and law enforcement; a training and exercise mandate for search and rescue; and a CBRNE assessment and strategic plan. In 2011, the region produced several region-wide plans focusing on catastrophic disaster management. The plans cover:

- Interim Housing
- Mass Fatality Management
- Donations Management
- Mass Care
- Debris Removal
- Mass Transportation
- Volunteer Management

All these plans and strategies from 2008 and beyond have been reviewed and relevant key elements have been integrated into this overall regional Bay Area Homeland Security Strategy.

Finally, the homeland security planning and implementation process has no "end state" any more than traditional public safety has an end point. Rather, it is a constant cycle of improving plans, procedures, systems and operations designed to enhance security and preparedness for the region. The Bay Area is committed to this process and the 2012 Bay Area Homeland Security Strategy is the latest product in that endeavor.

SECTION 3

VISION

The Bay Area's vision for homeland security is a secure, prepared and resilient region consistently developing regional capabilities based on risk through collaboration and coordination.

The Bay Area's vision will be implemented through a set of guiding principles that will help shape this regional Strategy and its implementation and maintenance. These principles are:

- Homeland security is a shared responsibility among all regional members at all levels of government and the private sector.
- Local jurisdictions and sub-regions are in the best position to know how to achieve regional goals and objectives.
- Each individual jurisdiction and the region as a whole will be best able to implement its vision for homeland security through regional collaboration and cooperation.
- The region will strive to use empirical data to drive its homeland security programs to include risk and capabilities assessment data.
- Every individual and family across the region has a critical role to play in homeland security from preparing for disasters to helping deter and detect terrorist plots.
- The region will strive to develop and share best practices in homeland security across the region and the State of California and recognizes that such best practices are often first developed at the local level.
- The region will responsibly leverage and manage funds to achieve the optimal result with the dollars available. This will include, wherever possible, the integration of State Homeland Security Program grants and UASI grants among others.

SECTION 4

FOCUS & MISSION

4.1 Focus and Mission Overview

To accomplish the Bay Area’s vision for homeland security, this Strategy and its goals and objectives are focused and organized around managing major/regional threats and hazards through the five³ mission areas of homeland security: prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery. Certain programs cross all mission areas; these are listed in this document under the category “common.” The Strategy also reflects that day-to-day public safety policy development and implementation is the responsibility of local jurisdictions, while at the same time recognizing that such local capabilities are essential to building regional capacity for which this Strategy is designed. Each strategic goal and objective under this Strategy will be based upon and built to help the region achieve one or more of these mission areas. The five mission areas are broken down as follows:

4.1.1 Prevention

Prevention involves actions to avoid an incident or to intervene or stop a terrorist incident from occurring. It involves applying intelligence to a range of activities that may include such countermeasures as deterrence operations; heightened inspections; improved surveillance and security operations; investigations to determine the full nature of the threat; and, specific law enforcement operations aimed at deterring, preempting, interdicting, or disrupting illegal activity and apprehending potential perpetrators.

4.1.2 Protection

Protection involves actions to reduce the vulnerability of critical infrastructure or key resources in order to deter, mitigate, or neutralize terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. It includes awareness elevation and understanding of threats and vulnerabilities to critical facilities, systems, and functions; identification and promotion of effective infrastructure sector-specific protection practices and methodologies; and information sharing among private entities within the sector, as well as between government and private entities.

4.1.3 Mitigation

Mitigation involves efforts to reduce loss of life and property by lessening the impact of disasters. Mitigation is achieved through risk analysis, which results in information that provides a foundation for mitigation activities that reduce risk. Mitigation includes ongoing public education and outreach activities designed to reduce loss of life and destruction of property; complying with or exceeding floodplain management and land-use regulations; enforcing

³ When the mission areas were first developed the mitigation mission area was not formally recognized. In 2011, PPD-8 formally adopted mitigation as a homeland security mission area. Thus, up until 2011, there were only four mission areas plus the common mission area. This change is most relevant when dealing with the Target Capabilities List, which is aligned to the four mission areas, plus common, and the new Core Capabilities List, which is aligned to the five mission areas plus common, each of which is discussed in sections 4.3 and 4.4 respectively.

stringent building codes, seismic design standards, and wind-bracing requirements for new construction, repairs, or retrofitting of existing buildings.

4.1.4 Response

Response includes activities that address the short-term, direct effects of an incident. Response includes immediate actions to save lives, protect property, and meet basic human needs. Response also includes the execution of emergency operations plans and of mitigation activities designed to limit the loss of life, personal injury, property damage, and other unfavorable outcomes.

4.1.5 Recovery

Recovery involves activities that include the development, coordination, and execution of service-and-site-restoration plans; the reconstitution of government operations and services; individual, private-sector, nongovernmental, and public-assistance programs to provide housing and to promote restoration; long-term care and treatment of affected persons; and additional measures for social, political, environmental, and economic restoration.

4.2 The National Priorities

The National Homeland Security Priorities represent broad and thematic goals that fall under the mission areas that the Nation should strive to achieve in homeland security. The National Homeland Security Priorities are:

- Implement the National Incident Management System and National Response Framework
- Implement the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
- Expand Regional Collaboration
- Strengthen Information Sharing and Collaboration Capabilities
- Strengthen CBRNE Detection, Response and Decontamination Capabilities
- Strengthen Interoperable and Operable Communications Capabilities
- Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness
- Strengthen Medical Surge and Mass Prophylaxis Capabilities

4.3 The Target Capabilities List

The Target Capabilities List (TCL) is a list of thirty seven capabilities needed to implement and achieve the National Priorities and the four specific mission areas of prevention, protection, response, and recovery, and a common capability category referring to those capabilities that apply to all mission areas. The current TCL is as follows:

Common Capabilities

- Planning
- Communications
- Community Preparedness and Participation
- Risk Management
- Intelligence and Information Sharing and Dissemination

Prevent Mission Capabilities

- Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warning
- Intelligence Analysis and Production
- Counter-Terror Investigation and Law Enforcement
- CBRNE Detection

Protect Mission Capabilities

- Critical Infrastructure Protection
- Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense
- Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation
- Laboratory Testing

Respond Mission Capabilities

- On-Site Incident Management
- Emergency Operations Center Management

Respond Capabilities Cont.

- Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution
- Volunteer Management and Donations
- Responder Safety and Health
- Emergency Public Safety and Security
- Animal Disease Emergency Support
- Environmental Health
- Explosive Device Response Operations
- Fire Incident Response Support
- WMD and Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination
- Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place
- Isolation and Quarantine
- Search and Rescue (Land-Based)
- Emergency Public Information and Warning
- Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment
- Medical Surge
- Medical Supplies Management and Distribution
- Mass Prophylaxis
- Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding and Related Services)
- Fatality Management

Recover Mission Capabilities

- Structural Damage Assessment
- Restoration of Lifelines
- Economic and Community Recovery

4.4 The Core Capabilities List

In September 2011, DHS released the new National Preparedness Goal. At the center of the new Goal is the Core Capabilities List (CCL). The CCL is a list of 32 capabilities necessary to address a wide range of hazards based on the results of a national risk assessment conducted by DHS. The CCL serves as the successor to the TCL. However, given the nascent stage of the CCL, its utility as a planning tool at the State level is marginal at present. The first utilization of the CCL will take place with the 2011 State Preparedness Report due on December 31, 2011. Therefore, wait for further guidance from DHS and maturation of the CCL before additional planning uses are availed. A list of the CCL is set forth below.

Core Capabilities by Mission Area

Common				
Planning				
Public Information and Warning				
Operational Coordination				
Prevention	Protection	Mitigation	Response	Recovery
Forensics and Attribution	Access Control and Identity Verification	Community Resilience	Critical Transportation	Economic Recovery
Intelligence and Information Sharing	Cyber Security	Long-term Vulnerability Reduction	Environmental Response/Health and Safety	Health and Social Services
Interdiction and Disruption	Intelligence and Information Sharing	Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment	Fatality Management Services	Housing
Screening, Search, and Detection	Interdiction and Disruption	Threats and Hazard Identification	Infrastructure Systems	Infrastructure Systems
	Physical Protective Measures		Mass Care Services	Natural and Cultural Resources
	Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities		Mass Search and Rescue Operations	
	Screening, Search, and Detection		On-scene Security and Protection	
	Supply Chain Integrity and Security		Operational Communications	
			Public and Private Services and Resources	
			Public Health and Medical Services	
			Situational Assessment	

SECTION 5

BAY AREA DESCRIPTION AND STRUCTURE

5.1 Bay Area Overview


The Bay Area is inclusive of over 100 incorporated cities and a combined total population exceeding 7.5 million people. In addition to the 7.5 million residents, the Bay Area attracts 15.9 million visitors annually who spend more than \$16.6 million per day in the region. The Bay Area is one of the most culturally diverse regions in California. With just over 800,000 residents, San Francisco is the 4th most populous city in California and the most densely populated major city in the State. San Jose is the third largest city in California with Oakland being the eighth largest in the State.

From the beginning of the UASI program in 2003, the geographic foot print of DHS- designated UASI jurisdictions has been a combination of DHS determined risk analysis and existing state, local and regional compacts. The formula used by DHS has changed almost yearly, along with the number of eligible jurisdictions, with one of the most dramatic shifts occurring in 2006. That year, DHS combined the three previously independent UASI jurisdictions of Oakland, San Francisco, and San Jose into the current Bay Area UASI.

The current Bay Area UASI region is comprised of twelve counties (Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Solano, Sonoma, Monterey and San Benito) and the three major cities of Oakland, San Francisco, and San Jose. In 2005, prior to the DHS led consolidation, this group initiated regional planning and collaboration efforts by developing the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP). A map of the current Bay Area UASI is set forth below.

Map of the 12 County Bay Area UASI

2008 marked another major shift in how DHS calculates risk and determines UASI funding eligibility. That year, per the 9/11 Act passed by Congress, DHS began a new evaluation process that utilized the U.S. Census-determined Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) to determine eligibility and rank those UASI jurisdictions eligible for funding. In using this approach, jurisdictions within the MSA are included in the DHS risk analysis, but are not necessarily included in the actual UASI region's geographic footprint for funding. In the case of the Bay Area UASI, the region's twelve county geographic foot print is actually **larger** than the MSA region used by DHS to calculate risk. This is rare. The Bay Area UASI includes Santa Cruz, Sonoma, Solano, Monterey and San Benito counties, which are not part of the MSA used by DHS to calculate risk and then rank and fund the Bay Area under the UASI program.



5.2 Bay Area Management

The Bay Area homeland security program is comprised of the UASI grant program, COPS Technology Grant, Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program (IECGP), Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program (RCPGP), and the Public Safety Interoperable Communications (PSIC) grant program. These grants serve as both terrorism and all hazards preparedness programs. Thus, this Strategy is focused on all hazards with a particular emphasis on terrorism preparedness.

Governed by a multi-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the participants, the Bay Area UASI is managed through a three-tiered governance structure. The Bay Area's governance structure is widely viewed as having an important, groundbreaking regional approach that has been recognized, and may be replicated, throughout the State of California and across the country as a homeland security best practice.

5.2.1 Approval Authority

The top tier is the eleven-member Approval Authority that includes representation from each of the three major cities of Oakland, San Francisco, and San Jose and the County of Alameda, County of Contra Costa, County of Marin, County of Monterey, County of San Francisco, County of San Mateo, County of Santa Clara and County of Sonoma. An Appointee from the Secretary of the California Emergency Management Agency (CalEMA) is also a non-voting member. The Approval Authority provides policy direction to the program and is responsible for final decisions.

5.2.3 Advisory Committee

The eleven-member Approval Authority works collaboratively with an Advisory Group which acts as the second tier of the governance structure. Advisory Group members include one representative each from the twelve Bay Area county operational areas, the three major cities, the regional fusion center and an appointee from the Secretary of CalEMA. The Advisory Group makes policy and programmatic recommendations to the Approval Authority and ensures there is broad representation, input and participation in the regional planning process.

5.2.4 Management Team

Managing the day-to-day work of the Bay Area UASI is a Management Team comprised of a general manager, strategy and compliance director, several project managers, a finance manager, and grants managers. The City and County of San Francisco has been designated as the fiscal agent for the grants managed by the Bay Area.

5.2.5 Work Groups

The Bay Area also engages a variety of stakeholders throughout the region to move projects and initiatives forward and to provide essential input for decision makers of the Bay Area's homeland security efforts. Working groups generally organize themselves around the Strategy's goals and objective. For example, the CBRNE Work Group manages issues related to the CBRNE goal (Goal 4 - Strengthen CBRNE Detection, Response, and Decontamination Capabilities). Work group members represent diverse interests and areas of expertise at the local, regional and state level. Each work group meets on an as needed basis to address identified projects and issues.

SECTION 6

RISK OVERVIEW

6.1 Introduction

A core element of Bay Area strategic planning is utilizing risk data and risk management principles to guide planning and investments. In late 2011, the Bay Area completed an update to the 2009 regional risk analysis and 2010 risk validation of terrorism and natural hazards risk, the results of which are summarized here.⁴ As risk is a dynamic attribute and can shift over time, the 2011 follow-up analysis builds upon the solid baseline established in 2009 and 2010 and will need to be updated again in the future.

The purpose of this section is to highlight and summarize the key findings from the 2011 risk validation analysis as outlined in the Risk Analysis Center as of November 2011. This section begins by providing details regarding the risk methodology utilized for completing the risk analysis. Although the 2011 risk analysis focused primarily on terrorism risk, the Bay Area also considered risks posed by natural hazards. In terms of terrorism events, the 2011 analysis considered the sixteen terrorism scenarios that could potentially impact the region. The analysis goes on to determine which of those scenarios posed the greatest relative risk to the region. The focus then moved to defining the public and private sector critical assets for risk analysis and then to analyzing asset risk by each of the critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) sectors across the entire region as defined by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP).

⁴ The full results of the 2009 risk analysis and 2010 and 2011 risk validation analysis can be found in the Risk Analysis Center (RAC), which is a dynamic, web based tool utilized by the Bay Area UASI to conduct the risk analysis and that will be further used to collect additional risk data to enhance the region's understanding of the risk faced by the region, its people and CI/KR.

6.2 Risk Methodology

A terrorism event is defined under federal law as the “...unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”⁵ A natural event causes a hazard when it harms people or property. Such natural events may include floods, earthquakes, tornadoes, tsunamis, coastal storms, landslides, and wildfires that strike populated areas.

Risk is the expected negative impact of an adverse event on an asset, considering both its likelihood and the magnitude of its impact. Risk can be expressed as a number or value in order to make comparisons. It is calculated based on threat, vulnerability, and consequence: **Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence.**

Threat: The likelihood of the occurrence of an event, including those that are naturally occurring (like hurricanes and earthquakes) and those that are man-made (including industrial accidents and terrorist attacks). Likelihood refers to the estimate of the potential of an incident or event’s occurrence as compared to other scenarios in a particular region and takes into account adversarial intent and capabilities.

Vulnerability: Likelihood of the asset succumbing to an attack by the specific type of threat. This is a function of an asset’s recognizability, resilience, and countermeasures effectiveness. The higher the vulnerability, the more likely the attack will succeed.

Consequence: Consequences of an attack can impact one or all of the following:

- Human: The adverse impact of an attack on human health as measured by the number of fatalities and injuries the attack causes and the resulting long term health effects.
- Economic: The economic harm caused by an attack as measured by short term costs of repair efforts, as well as the long term impact of an attack on the economic activity of the asset attacked.
- Mission: The severity of the impairment of the mission of the asset that an attack inflicts. Mission interruption includes the degree of interruption, geographic scope, and mission criticality.
- Psychological: The adverse impact of an attack on the morale and confidence of the population. Such adverse impacts may include a reduced sense of general well-being, concerns about personal security, and reduced confidence in the government and the economy.

⁵ 28 C.F.R. Section 0.85

Multiple kinds of risk exist, and driving the Bay Area's risk profile are the characteristics of the assets and population in the area. Further, an area may have a higher risk of one type but not necessarily of others. The Bay Area currently looks at risk in four broad categories:

- Terrorism Risk to People
- Terrorism Risk to Assets
- Natural Hazard Risk to People
- Natural Hazard Risk to Assets

Population risk takes into account not only how many people are present in a given area but also how those people are distributed within a jurisdiction or region (local population density). Population risk calculations consider residents, commuters, and international visitors in a given area. While asset risk looks at the risk to the area from attacks on or incidents involving an area's critical infrastructure, population risk gives an overview of risk to the major population-at-large.

6.3 Description of Terrorism Scenarios

The following is a summary of the sixteen scenarios used to help determine the Bay Area's terrorism risk profile. These scenarios are based, in part, upon actual terrorist methods used in attacks around the world such as improvised explosive devices and conventional assaults. While several of the attack scenarios listed have never been used by terrorists, e.g., an improvised nuclear device against a major U.S. city, the intent to acquire and use such weapons and tactics has been clearly articulated by certain terrorist groups.

Terrorism Scenarios

Scenario	Description
Agro-terrorism	An attack on the agriculture/food supply chain. Largely designed to inflict economic damage.
Aircraft as a Weapon	The aircraft as a weapon scenario consists of attackers using an airplane to inflict a direct impact on a target. Damage to the asset is a result of the initial explosion of the airplane's fuel supply, as well as secondary events like fires or building collapses.
Arson/Incendiary Attack	Arson or incendiary attacks have been used widely throughout history by terrorist groups and criminals. Attacks vary widely in scope and intensity, from the use of one small incendiary device like a Molotov cocktail to setting a fire from multiple ignition points on one site using highly flammable fuel. In 2008, the Earth Liberation Front burned down a housing development in Woodinville, Washington. The Provisional Irish Republican Army made extensive use of Molotov cocktails in their fight against British control of Ireland.
Biological Attack (Contagious)	Use of a biological agent that can be spread from human to human and results in negative health effects. This includes the intentional release of communicable infectious diseases such as pandemic flu and Bubonic Plague.
Biological Attack (Non-contagious)	Use of a biological agent that cannot be directly spread from human to human but results in negative health effects. Non-contagious biological attacks typically require direct contact or inhalation with a biological strain. The 2001 Anthrax attacks, which killed 5 people, are one such example.
Chemical Attack	A chemical release on a population using toxic and corrosive chemicals that generate poisonous gases, liquids, and other hazardous substance. Chemical attacks include the release of a nerve agent, blister agent, or industrial chemicals used against an asset's population. Scenario includes aerosol or other distribution of Mustard Gas, Arsenic, Mercury, Sarin or other similar substances. This also considers the use of explosives against Chlorine tanks.
Conventional Attack	Conventional attacks include attacks executed with weapons that are not weapons of mass destruction. This can include grenades, bombs, mines, missiles, small firearms, and large-caliber artillery systems. One of the most notable conventional attacks in recent history is the 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India, in which terrorists affiliated with the Islamist group Lashkar-e-Taiba attacked multiple public sites with bombs and guns.
Cyber Attack	Computer-based attack aimed to disrupt the function of an asset or obtain sensitive information from the asset's computer systems. Attacks may seek to compromise the target through service disruption or manipulation using destructive worms and viruses, Denial of Service exploits, and intrusions. Actors either inside or outside of the asset's organization could carry out acts of sabotage.
Food, and Water Contamination	Poisoning or otherwise tampering with a food/water distribution point in such a way that causes harmful health effects. Poisoning may include the use of bacteria, viruses, and heavy metals. Attacks at a distribution point may spread among the population.
Hostage	Attack in which terrorists enter an asset and hold captives; also any attack


Scenario	Description
Taking/Assassination	targeting and killing key officials or significant persons who are present at a site.
Improvised Explosive Device (IED)	IEDs are bombs that are not of standard military construction, but may utilize components that are. Constructed using any type of explosive material, fuse, detonator, and container, they can also include biological, chemical, or other contaminants. IEDs have been used widely by terrorist groups; recent examples include use by the Taliban in Afghanistan against Coalition and Afghan forces and by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam against the Sri Lankan government, most often via suicide bombers.
Maritime Attack	Use of a sea vessel to deliver explosives against a target, such as another ship or port asset directly adjacent to a waterway. In 2000, 17 were killed when such an attack targeted the USS Cole.
Nuclear Device	A nuclear device scenario involves the detonation of a weapon assembled using highly enriched uranium, most likely stolen or purchased from an unstable nuclear or former nuclear state. A device could be assembled near an urban area and transported via vehicle to a densely-populated downtown location for detonation. Such an attack has yet to occur; however, overwhelming casualties within 12 miles can be expected, with decreasing casualty rates extending over a 150 mile radius. Long-term environmental and health effects can be expected, as well as damage exceeding \$100b.
Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD)	An attack, also called a 'dirty bomb', combining radioactive materials and conventional explosives. The explosives cause damage and casualties within the blast radius and spread radiation over a larger area. Though a potentially large number of people could be exposed, the radiation levels are unlikely to cause significant deaths. However, a radiation attack would have considerable psychological effects on the public.
Sabotage/Theft	Sabotage encompasses any act intended to prevent an asset from engaging in its mission. It can affect any sector and any level of an asset, and it may be carried out by any actor to include disgruntled employees or terrorists. Sabotage is often classified solely or simultaneously as other crimes, such as arson. An unidentified individual injected a glue-like substance into a remote shutdown panel at a nuclear power plant in St Lucie, Florida in 1996. In 2006, the Salafist Group for Call and Combat vandalized and set fire to an Algerian cement plant and company vehicles.
Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED)	VBIEDs are IEDs delivered via vehicles. A large sedan can yield up to 1,000 lbs of explosives in the trunk alone; a small box truck can yield over 10,000 lbs. By comparison, the truck used in the Oklahoma City bombing was carrying 4800 lbs of explosives. This method of attack is historically common and still used by groups such as al Qaeda, which describes the attack in detail in its training manual.

6.4 Threats and Hazards

The focus of the analysis for the 2011 risk validation was on terrorism scenarios and overall terrorism risk. However, an analysis was also done concerning natural hazards such as earthquakes, floods and wildfires, etc. This is based on the fact that while natural hazard risk plays a role in how the Bay Area will set its strategic goals and objectives, that role is contingent on a link to terrorism preparedness. Thus, the Bay Area's focus is on building capabilities that have a primary nexus to terrorism while recognizing that such capabilities may also have a dual purpose of enhancing all hazards preparedness. This concept of "dual use" has been recognized and encouraged by DHS for many years when developing strategies and investments.

6.4.1 Terrorism Scenarios

In analyzing the risk of certain attacks against the region's CI/KR, two of the sixteen terrorist methods stood out as outlined in the figure to the right entitled "Terrorism Scenario Risk Profile." The top four scenarios for the Bay Area region included the vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack, the aircraft as a weapon attack, a conventional IED attack and a contagious biological attack rounding out the top four. The VBIED attack method stood out by a considerable margin, accounting for 50% of the total risk to the region's assets. These four scenarios were followed by the remaining twelve attack methods.




6.4.2 Natural Hazards Risk

The Bay Area's CI/KR also face significant risk from natural hazards; in particular floods and earthquakes. As outlined in the figure below to the right, entitled "Natural Hazard Scenario Risk Profile," floods pose the greatest risk to the Bay Area's CI/KR based upon their frequency, the region's vulnerability to such an event and the consequences of major flooding in terms of lives and property.


The Bay Area rests upon one of the longest and most active earthquake fault systems in the world. This system includes the San Andreas Fault, the Hayward Fault and the Calaveras Fault. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates an 80% chance of a magnitude 6.7 or greater quake striking the Bay Area within the next 30 years.

Based on the Bay Area's topography, the risk from wild land fires is also a reality. Four wildfires in California have burned at least 200,000 acres since 2007. Though evacuations help limit casualties, significant economic loss can still occur.



6.5 Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources

For the 2011 update, the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC or Fusion Center) compiled a list of 6,815 self-identified critical infrastructure and key resource assets in the entire Bay Area that cover all 18 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) sectors. A breakdown of those critical assets by sector is set forth in the pie chart to the right entitled “Distribution of Assets by NIPP Sector.”



The NCRIC led the process of nominating, reviewing and assessing assets for the risk validation analysis. The Fusion Center started with the 2,867 sites previously identified in the 2010 regional risk assessment (a considerable increase from the original 566 assets identified in 2009) and then added sites from various groups/sectors, including the twelve county operational areas and two major cities, that the Fusion Center deemed appropriate based upon available threat, vulnerability and consequence data.

The NCRIC has further refined these assets into four priority levels for the region (level I being the highest and level IV being the lowest priority) with the vast majority of the assets (over 5,000) falling in priority level IV, the lowest priority level. Such a breakdown reflects the region’s goal of accounting for as many assets as possible while recognizing that a smaller subset of those assets, if attacked or otherwise incapacitated, could have a devastating impact on the region.

Much of the Bay Area’s infrastructure is found in the commercial, government and emergency services sectors. However, as outlined in the chart on the page below, the terrorism asset risk in the Bay Area does not follow the sectors with the largest number of assets. This is most prevalent in the emergency services sector where the sector ranks 3rd in total number of assets and yet ranks 13th in risk. The cause of this type of discrepancy is the nature and type of assets in each sector. A small group of assets or even a single asset can have very high risk due to the likelihood of an attack, the vulnerability to attack and the human, economic, mission and psychological consequences resulting from an attack. When it comes to risk, “quality” very much outweighs “quantity.”

Bay Area CI/KR Sector Rankings


Rank	Sectors Ranked by Total Assets	Sectors Ranked by Risk
1	Government	Government
2	Commercial	Transportation
3	Emergency Services	Banking
4	Postal	Commercial
5	Transportation	Health
6	Banking	Defense Industrial Base
7	Health	Monuments and Icons
8	Water	Energy
9	Food and Agriculture	Water
10	Dams	Communications
11	Energy	Postal
12	Communications	Chemical
13	Information Technology	Emergency Services
14	Critical Manufacturing	Dams
15	Chemical	Critical Manufacturing
16	Monuments	Information Technology
17	Defense Industrial Base	Food and Agriculture
18	Nuclear	Nuclear

The current 2011 list of 6,815 assets represents a major change from 2010 when the region accounted for 2,867 assets. Thus, the Bay Area's asset list is by no means static and will certainly change as the quality of information available to the region continues to improve. For now, the current list reflects a broad representation across multiple CI/KR sectors that local subject matter expertise, using best available methods, deem appropriate.

6.6 Asset Risk by Sector

For 2011, nearly two thirds, or 66% of the Bay Area region's terrorism asset-based risk is located in the government and transportation sectors. Another 27% of asset-based risk can be found in the banking, commercial and healthcare sectors as shown in the figure to the right entitled "Distribution of Terrorism Risk by Sector." This reflects a shift from both 2009 where the information technology, government, commercial, healthcare, transportation and water sectors rounded out the top six sectors and 2010 where healthcare, government, commercial, information technology, transportation and monuments and icons rounded out the top six based on terrorism asset risk. With the large number of assets added in 2011 and a better understanding of all the assets assessed, the Bay Area continues to enhance its understanding of terrorism asset risk across the region.

Distribution of Terrorism Risk by Sector



An overarching theme from the 2010 and 2011 analysis is that simply because a sector may be at high or low risk from a particular attack scenario or multiple attack scenarios, each individual asset within each sector may have a risk profile vastly different from the sector at large. This requires regional planners, asset owners and operators, and the agencies responsible for prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery activities to evaluate risk data both individually by site and by attack scenario in order to make more precise security investment decisions on specific assets and sectors.

6.7 Risk Relevant Capabilities

Once the 2011 risk assessment was complete, the Bay Area analyzed the relevance of the 37 Target Capabilities based on the region's risk profile. Capability relevance is defined as those capabilities most needed in order to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to or recover from threats and acts of terrorism. Some of the 37 capabilities are relevant to many different types of hazards affecting the spectrum of critical infrastructure sectors, while others link closely to a few discrete scenarios.

Mapping the relevance of each capability to different scenarios provides a general framework that can be tailored based on the results of the Bay Area's risk analysis. This approach positions

the Bay Area to understand which capabilities are more or less relevant considering its specific risk profile.

The risk relevant ranking of capabilities was then combined with the results of the 2011 regional capabilities assessment in order to produce a final list of capabilities prioritized based upon risk relevance and level of ability. The higher the risk relevance for a capability combined with a low level of ability in that same capability the greater the need to close the capability gap(s).

SECTION 7

GOALS, OBJECTIVES & IMPLEMENTATION STEPS

7.1 Introduction

The goals and objectives of the Strategy serve as the core for what the Bay Area will seek to achieve over the next three years in the mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery. The goals and objectives represent the culmination of integrating risk and capabilities assessment by establishing specific implementation steps that are designed to achieve or maintain capability outcomes in those capabilities that are most relevant based on the Bay Area's risk and capability profile.

The goals and objectives represent not only the priorities of the region but also the region's implementation of State and National level policy and priorities at the regional level. As such, each goal is based on alignment with the National Homeland Security Priorities (and/or the State of California Homeland Security Strategy priorities) and each objective with the thirty seven Target Capabilities from the National Preparedness Guidelines, which outline the capabilities needed to implement the National Priorities and the five mission areas. The National Homeland Security Priorities are:

- Implement the National Incident Management System and National Response Framework
- Implement the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
- Expand Regional Collaboration
- Strengthen Information Sharing and Collaboration Capabilities
- Strengthen CBRNE Detection, Response and Decontamination Capabilities
- Strengthen Interoperable and Operable Communications Capabilities
- Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness
- Strengthen Medical Surge and Mass Prophylaxis Capabilities

Recognizing that homeland security is a continuing and evolutionary process requiring constant focus and improvement, each Bay Area strategic goal includes several more capability based objectives to further guide the region's efforts and help measure progress. The purpose of aligning each objective to a capability is to ensure the Strategy is designed around managing risk by enhancing capabilities through investments and other activities.

The goals and objectives are directed towards the next three years and will be reviewed and updated annually. It is likely that some of the objectives will carry over from year to year while others may be removed or updated based on the region's progress and actual needs. The goals and objectives will continue to be defined by risk analysis, identified preparedness gaps and sustainment priorities.

7.2 Organizing the Goals and Objectives

Organization and prioritization of goals and objectives is based on the most up to date risk and capabilities assessment data along with regional subject matter experts' input through a series of meetings and workshops. Each goal links to national mission area(s), National Priorities, Target Capabilities, and State of California homeland security strategic goal(s).

All of the 37 Target Capabilities were first organized under relevant National Priorities. The National Priorities were then converted, and sometimes merged, into localized goals with the Target Capabilities converted into specific objectives under each goal. Where no equivalent National Priority exists, the Bay Area simply developed its own goal to meet its own local needs. For example, the Bay Area has developed a recovery goal, whereas the federal government has not delineated recovery as a National Priority. In addition, the federal government has listed implementing the NIPP and Strengthening Information Sharing and Collaboration as separate National Priorities. The Bay Area has combined both priorities into a single regional goal designed to enhance information analysis and infrastructure protection.

7.3 Structuring the Goals and Objectives

The goals and objectives are structured around closing identified risk relevant capability gaps and sustaining sufficient levels of ability in risk relevant capabilities – those capabilities that are a priority for the Bay Area based upon its risk profile. While each capability from the Target Capabilities list is listed as its own objective, the objectives, like the Target Capabilities themselves, do not operate in a vacuum. Objectives often are linked to one another with elements of one objective sometimes found in another. This is a product of the fact that the 37 Target Capabilities are not isolated from each other. Rather, they overlap one another with elements of one capability present in another or even several others.

Using the capabilities-based planning model as outlined by DHS, each goal and related objective(s) will be implemented through a series of resource elements divided among the elements of capability: plans, organization, equipment, training and exercises (POETE) as defined in the chart below entitled “Elements of Capability.” The POETE resource elements delineate what resources are needed for the region to achieve each capability based objective. They serve as a critical strategic guide for the region and jurisdictions to develop actual projects that will result in achievement of a particular objective. As such, they are not an exhaustive list meant to limit steps necessary to achieve a goal or objective but instead operate as a roadmap.

The detail of a POETE implementation step may vary from objective to objective or even in a single objective depending on the level of detailed data available from risk and capabilities assessments. Finally, the region and jurisdictions are *not* required to generate projects for each goal and objective in a given grant or funding cycle. Rather, each grant applicant must prioritize projects based on this Strategy and their own risk and need.

Elements of Capability

Planning	Development of policies, plans, procedures, mutual aid agreements, strategies and other publications that comply with relevant laws, regulations, and guidance necessary to perform assigned missions and actions.
Organization	Specific personnel, groups or teams, an overall organizational structure, and leadership at each level in the structure that comply with relevant laws, regulations, and guidance necessary to perform assigned missions and tasks. Paid and volunteer staff who meet relevant qualification and certification standards necessary to perform assigned missions and tasks.
Equipment	Major items of equipment, supplies, facilities, and systems that comply with relevant standards necessary to perform assigned missions and tasks.
Training	Content and methods of delivery that comply with training standards necessary to perform assigned missions and tasks.
Exercises	Exercises, self-assessments, peer-assessments, outside review, compliance monitoring, and actual major events that provide opportunities to demonstrate, evaluate, and improve the combined capability and interoperability of the other capability elements to perform assigned missions and tasks to standards necessary to achieve successful outcomes.

Elements of Capability (source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Target Capabilities List, September 2007)

GOAL 1	Mission Area(s)	National Priorities	Target Capabilities	State Strategy
ENHANCE REGIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING PROGRAM	Common	All	Planning Risk Management	N/A

Risk Management

In 2009, the Bay Area began developing a regional risk management and planning program to enable the region to develop, sustain and fund programs, plans and operations based on risk and capabilities assessment data. In 2011, the region continued with this program by conducting a risk verification process and capabilities assessments in each of the twelve operational areas and one global Bay Area wide regional assessment.

A risk management framework is one in which all available data and subject matter expertise and experience is utilized to make informed decisions on what actions should be taken based on the costs of such actions and the return on investment in terms of mitigating the identified risks. A risk management program does not eliminate risk. It manages risk.

The regional risk management program encompasses virtually all of the region's activities from prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery efforts. At its core, the risk management framework is a planning tool that influences strategic, region-wide planning as well as tactical and operational level planning. In addition, the region will build upon its use of risk analytics to help inform how homeland security resources are allocated across the region to strengthen homeland security.

Objective 1.1: Develop and Enhance Risk Management Capabilities

Risk management has been defined by the federal government as a “continuous process of managing – through a series of mitigating actions that permeate an entity's activities – the likelihood of an adverse event and its impact.”

Objective 1.1 Outcome

Regional entities are able to identify and assess risks, prioritize and select appropriate protection, prevention, and mitigation plans, solutions and investments based on reduction of risk, monitor the outcomes of allocation decisions, and undertake corrective actions.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
1.1-P1	Develop an actionable risk management strategy that includes short, medium, and long term risk management objectives at the regional and jurisdictional level. This will include an annual risk overview report for the region and risk-based formulas to allocate resources to include funding.
1.1-P2	Assign a lead planner from the Bay Area UASI to coordinate the risk management program.
1.1-P3	Develop data collection timelines, requirements, and avenues for receiving information on threats, vulnerabilities, and consequence of loss from stakeholders at the regional, sub-regional and jurisdictional levels as part of an annual risk baseline assessment.
1.1-P4	Conduct annual risk validation analysis – threats, vulnerabilities, consequences - for the region and each operational area and such other entities as required across the Bay Area.
1.1-P5	The Bay Area has/or will rate and/or rank criticality of assets and potential targets from across the region.
1.1-P6	Organize and prioritize capabilities at the regional and jurisdictional level (where appropriate) based on those capabilities most directly linked to prioritized risks.
1.1-P7	Develop annual strategy implementation guidance and project templates for DHS UASI application process. Ensure project templates link projects to risk and capability gaps and Strategy goals and objectives.
1.1-P8	Develop an annual capability assessment and gap analysis process to determine where gaps remain among capabilities with an emphasis on those capabilities necessary to address the region's highest risks.
1.1-P9	Assign/hire planners to assist in the implementation, evaluation and updating of the Bay Area Homeland Security Strategy and preparedness report at the regional, sub-regional and jurisdictional levels.
1.1-P10	Produce a Bay Area annual report that outlines the annual accomplishment and major activities to ensure all appropriate stakeholders are kept informed.
1.1-P11	Conduct grant effectiveness analysis and produce grant effectiveness reports to demonstrate the value of UASI and other homeland security grants to local, state and national leaders.

1.1-P12	Bay Area UASI Management Team to provide strategic planning technical assistance to Operational Areas as needed.
ORGANIZATION	
1.1.-O1	Communicate in writing with all regional stakeholders the risk management process and the intent to use risk in decision making.
1.1-O2	Develop a risk management framework to outline how risk assessments and risk analysis serve the process of managing “risks” and a process for stakeholder buy-in across all four sub-regions. This will include a comprehensive stakeholder governing process and governing bodies to oversee the risk management process.
1.1-O3	Assign/hire risk analysts to conduct risk analysis and produce risk products on behalf of the region, sub-regions and jurisdictions
EQUIPMENT	
1.1-E1	Acquire capabilities and risk management software and systems for the region to conduct risk analysis to include threats, vulnerabilities and consequence of loss analysis to support tactical, operation and strategic level planning and operations. Utilize the system to develop prioritized planning scenarios for the region and local jurisdictions.
1.1-E2	Other necessary equipment
TRAINING	
1.1-T1	Conduct principles of risk management training for policy makers and stakeholders from across the region.
1.1-T2	Train Bay Area UASI Management Team and the fusion center staff on the use of risk analytic tools and software planning systems.
EXERCISES	
1.1-Ex1	Ensure UASI exercise program is risk based with scenarios used and capabilities tested tied to risk.

GOAL 2	Mission Area(s)	National Priorities	Target Capabilities	State Strategy
ENHANCE INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION CAPABILITIES	Prevention Protection	Strengthen Information Sharing and Collaboration Capabilities Implement the NIPP Enhance Regional Collaboration	Counter-Terrorism Investigations and Law Enforcement Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings Intelligence Analysis and Production Intelligence Information Sharing and Dissemination Critical Infrastructure Protection	Goal 1: Enhance Information Analysis and Law Enforcement Capabilities. Goal 2: Protect Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources

The National Intelligence and CI/KR Protection Framework

Collecting and sharing information to protect critical infrastructure from threats and acts of terrorism is a core element of homeland security. In October 2007, to better coordinate the Nation's information sharing activities, the Federal Government released the *National Strategy for Information Sharing* (National Strategy). In 2006, DHS published the final *National Infrastructure Protection Plan* (NIPP) with a revised version released in 2009. Both the NIPP and the National Strategy represent the national level plan for information sharing and CI/KR protection, the implementation of which often occurs at the local level.

The *National Strategy* is intended to ensure that those responsible for combating terrorism and protecting local communities have access to the timely and accurate information they need by:

- Providing a framework for enhanced information sharing among federal, state, local, and tribal officials; the private sector; and foreign partners to aid their individual missions and to help secure the U.S. homeland.
- Describing the Federal Government's approach to supporting state and major urban-area fusion centers, as well as national efforts to fight crime and make local communities safer.

- Recognizing that as information-sharing capabilities are enhanced, it is imperative that the legal rights of U.S. citizens continue to be protected, especially in the area of privacy and civil liberties.

The goal of the *NIPP* is to enhance protection of the Nation's CI/KR to prevent, deter, neutralize, or mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts by terrorists to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit them; and to strengthen national preparedness, timely response, and rapid recovery in the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other emergency. The *NIPP*'s supporting CI/KR Sector-Specific Plans were released in May 2007 and provide the coordinated approach to establish national priorities, goals, and requirements for protection across each of the 18 CI/KR sectors at the national level.

The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative

Virtually every sophisticated terrorist attack has involved some form of pre-attack planning, surveillance and logistical support functions. Most of these pre-attack activities may or may not be criminal in nature, but virtually all could appear suspicious if viewed in isolation and potentially unravel a terrorist plot if viewed in total by a fusion center or other intelligence agency. In order for such a total view to take place, the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative was created to allow law enforcement agencies to “develop, evaluate, and implement common processes and policies for gathering, documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing information about terrorism-related suspicious activities.” The Bay Area's Fusion Center and law enforcement agencies can play a critical role in this process by linking not only suspicious activities in the region but fusing those regional SARs with other suspicious activities from across the country to determine if terrorist plots are underway.

California's Intelligence Structure

Consistent with the *National Strategy* and the *NIPP*, the State of California has developed the State Threat Assessment System (STAS) to “protect California's citizenry and economy from terrorism and other criminality by collaboratively producing and disseminating critical threat information to its homeland security partners.” The STAS is a public safety partnership that obtains, analyzes, and shares information, and collaboratively develops and shares California-specific counter-terrorism intelligence products enabling law enforcement to prevent terrorism in California.

The STAS is made up primarily of the State Threat Assessment Center (STAC), which is the State Fusion Center operated by the California Highway Patrol and CalEMA; the CalDoJ Intelligence Operations Center (IOC); and four Regional Threat Assessment Centers (RTAC) located in San Diego, Los Angeles, Sacramento and the Bay Area. The STAS is a partnership of these organizations with no single organization exercising command and control over the other. In 2008, California issued the STAS Strategic Business Plan Concept of Operations, which outlines the vision, mission, structure and operations of the STAS. This ConOp was updated in early 2011.

The STAC is responsible for coordinating with the RTACs and compiling the overall State Threat Assessment. It supports regional intelligence analysis by supplying the RTACs with

additional analytical support. Each RTAC's geographic area of responsibility coincides with the local FBI field office for that region. The RTAC's work extensively with their local FBI led Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and Field Intelligence Group (FIG).

Operating within each RTAC is a Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) program made up of public safety agency officer(s) trained in understanding terrorism who serve as the bidirectional gateway for terrorism information between the members of his/her own department, the RTACs and CI/KR owners and operators.

The Bay Area's Intelligence and Infrastructure Protection Structure

The NCRIC serves as the Bay Area's RTAC and Fusion Center. The NCRIC helps safeguard the region by assisting public safety agencies from across the Bay Area in their mission to detect, prevent, investigate and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. The NCRIC is a cooperative federal, state and local public safety effort to centralize the intake, analysis, fusion, synthesis, and appropriate dissemination of criminal and homeland security intelligence. The NCRIC disseminates intelligence and facilitates communications between state, local, federal agencies and private sector partners, in order to help them take action on threats and public safety issues.

The NCRIC is also the region's primary infrastructure protection management entity. It embodies the Bay Area's approach to information sharing and analysis and critical infrastructure protection which is to fuse the two missions by collecting, analyzing and sharing threats to CI/KR in order to review intelligence data and map threats against CI/KR, determining the threatened infrastructure's vulnerability, and recommending a suite of protective measures and other resources to mitigate the risk posed by the threat.

While the NCRIC plays a vital in homeland security and public safety across the Bay Area, it's continued capabilities are at risk due to the fact that the NCRIC is heavily reliant on federal grant funding to sustain its personnel and capabilities; a fact outlined in the most recent federally led fusion center baseline capabilities assessment. As federal grant funds go down, the Bay Area will strive to maintain the NCRIC's capability level in an ever tightening budget environment.

The Bay Area will work with its partners at all levels of government and the private sector throughout the intelligence cycle to ensure that information is turned into useful intelligence while at the same time respecting the privacy and civil liberties of all of its people. This will include enhanced cooperation and coordination with the region's JTTF, the region's fusion center, local law enforcement, and private sector security forces in and around the region's critical infrastructure and key resources.

Objective 2.1 Increase Counter-Terrorism Investigations and Law Enforcement

Counter-Terror Investigation and Law Enforcement is the capability that includes the broad range of activities undertaken by law enforcement and related entities to detect, examine, probe, investigate, and conduct operations related to potential terrorist activities.

Objective 2.1 Outcome

Law enforcement agencies operating within the Bay Area have the resources to ensure that suspects involved in criminal activities related to homeland security are successfully identified, deterred, detected, disrupted, investigated, and apprehended

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
2.1-P1	The fusion center will develop a plan and procedures to ensure law enforcement investigators across the region receive timely threat and intelligence information.
2.1-P2	The fusion center will ensure that law enforcement agencies across the region contact the local JTTF when a connection to terrorism is discovered during a criminal investigation.
2.1-P3	The fusion center will ensure law enforcement uses investigative information to help identify potential critical infrastructure terrorism targets.
ORGANIZATION	
2.1-O1	Law enforcement agencies in the region will either maintain, or have access to, special operations teams compliant with the NIMS resource types (e.g., SWAT teams).
2.1-O2	Larger jurisdictions or entities will have each identified a designated liaison with the JTTF.
2.1-O3	Ensure staffing within the fusion center is in place for the coordination of interoperable information management and sharing system.
EQUIPMENT	
2.1-E1	Deploy interoperable information management and sharing system across all Bay Area justice agencies to include procurement of software and computer systems, hardware and peripherals.
2.1-E2	Sustain necessary law enforcement and counter terrorism equipment capabilities already in place.
2.1-E3	Other authorized law enforcement and counter terrorism equipment as agreed to by the region.

TRAINING	
2.1-T1	Provide training for patrol level officers on terrorism awareness, and protocols for passing information to the fusion center and the JTTF.
2.1-T2	Train law enforcement personnel to use investigative information to identify potential vulnerabilities/target lists with the fusion center.
2.1-T3	Provide computer-based and classroom training to TLOs, intelligence analysts, police investigators and other public safety personnel on the use of interoperable records management and information sharing systems.
2.1-T4	Law enforcement agencies across the Bay Area will ensure training to personnel for advanced foreign language capabilities.
2.1-T5	Law enforcement investigative personnel will be trained on, and become familiar with, the Terrorist Incident Annex to the NRF.
2.1-T6	Appropriate personnel will be trained in cultural awareness as it relates to terrorism.
2.1-T7	Provide training to law enforcement personnel on the use of tactical intelligence (maps, blueprints, etc.) prior to response operations.
2.1-T8	Enhance and provide hostage rescue training to law enforcement.
EXERCISES	
2.1-Ex1	Ensure UASI exercise program incorporates law enforcement and investigative capabilities into appropriate regional exercises and Fusion Center staff participate in regional exercises.

Objective 2.2 Enhance Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings

The Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warning Capability entails the gathering, consolidation, and retention of raw data and information from sources to include human sources, observation, technical sources and open (unclassified) materials.

Unlike intelligence collection, information gathering is the continual gathering of only pure, unexamined data, not the targeted collection traditionally conducted by the intelligence community or targeted investigations.

Objective 2.2 Outcome

The region is able to identify and systematically report, from multiple sources, including public safety personnel, the general public and private sector security personnel, suspicious activities or circumstances associated with potential terrorist or criminal pre-planning, support, and operations to the appropriate data/retrieval system. The information is then made available to information analysis centers, such as the NCRIC, for vetting and review and operational follow-up by the appropriate authorities.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
2.2-P1	The Fusion Center will lead the development of and maintain operationally sound policies to comply with regulatory, statutory, privacy, and other issues that may govern the gathering and storing of information.
2.2-P2	The Fusion Center will ensure jurisdictions understand and follow suspicious activity reporting guidelines.
2.2-P3	Ensure public awareness campaigns are in place, e.g. “see something, say something” at the jurisdictional level and within critical infrastructure sectors to ensure the public and private sectors report suspicious activity to appropriate authorities. Ensure the relevant information is shared with the NCRIC for action as necessary.
2.2-P4	The Fusion Center will ensure that processes, protocols, and technical capabilities are in place at the regional and sub-regional level to allow proactive reporting and extraction of information from public, private, and law enforcement databases.
2.2-P5	Develop plans and protocols to utilize social media in the acquisition of suspicious activity reports.
2.2-P6	The Fusion Center will develop plans, to include MOUs, MOAs, SOPs, among Bay Area jurisdictions, outside jurisdictions, and the State of California, for the deployment of automated license plate readers (ALPRs) at fixed critical infrastructure sites as well as roaming ALPRs.
ORGANIZATION	
2.2-O1	Counter-surveillance teams are developed and managed out of the Fusion Center and within certain law enforcement agencies across the region to provide counter-surveillance capabilities at CI/KR across the Bay Area.
2.2-O2	Develop a regional public awareness and reporting campaign for suspicious activity reporting similar to the National “If You See Something, Say Something” campaign, and IWatch in Los Angeles and Washington, DC, etc.

EQUIPMENT	
2.2-E1	Acquire and deploy interoperable ALPR systems at high risk critical infrastructure sites across the Bay Area to detect patterns of suspicious behavior indicative of terrorist pre-operational surveillance.
2.2-E2	Ensure surveillance detection equipment is acquired and deployed at critical infrastructure and other key sites in the Bay Area including: cameras, detectors, and sensors that can send data collected to the Fusion Center either directly or indirectly for analysis.
2.2-E3	Ensure all major law enforcement agencies across the Bay Area have the technology to gather and link suspicious activity reporting within each respective law enforcement agency.
2.2-E4	Acquire equipment to allow different law enforcement database systems to be linked and compatible, allowing for rapid transmission and processing of suspicious activity information across jurisdictions and with the Fusion Center.
2.2-E5	Acquire tools to conduct link analysis on suspicious activity reports to determine if a pattern of terrorist pre-operational behavior is occurring in the Bay Area.
2.2-E6	Other authorized terrorism incident prevention equipment as agreed to by the region.
TRAINING	
2.2-T1	Provide training to fire service, law enforcement and other public sector agency personnel on identifying and reporting suspicious activity to appropriate authorities.
2.2-T2	Train public and private sector, particularly security personnel at critical infrastructure sites, across the Bay Area on the detection and reporting of terrorism pre-attack surveillance and logistical/operational activities against CI/KR to the Fusion Center.
EXERCISES	
2.2-Ex1	Conduct exercises to test and evaluate surveillance detection capabilities of security personnel.

Objective 2.3 Strengthen Intelligence Analysis and Production

Intelligence Analysis and Production is the merging of data and information for the purpose of analyzing, linking, and disseminating timely and actionable intelligence with an emphasis on the larger public safety and homeland security threat picture. This process focuses on the consolidation of analytical products among the intelligence analysis units at the Federal, State,

local, and tribal levels for tactical, operational, and strategic use. This capability also includes the examination of raw data to identify threat pictures, recognize potentially harmful patterns, or connect suspicious links to discern potential indications or warnings.

Objective 2.3 Outcome

The NCRIC disseminates and produces timely, accurate, clear and actionable intelligence/information products in support of regional prevention, awareness, deterrence, response activities and operations.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
2.3-P1	Ensure Fusion Center planners and fiscal agents in place.
2.3-P2	Ensure Fusion Center intelligence products are user driven and provide strategic, operational and tactical level support to decision makers and operators.
2.3-P3	Maintain plans and protocols to ensure connectivity between the Fusion Center and other fusion centers in California.
ORGANIZATION	
2.3-O1	Provide funding to support fusion center staff including intelligence analysts.
2.3-O2	Ensure all necessary personnel possess valid and current national security clearances.
2.3-O3	Provide funding to support fusion center staff including critical infrastructure protection teams, public health and medical personnel, public safety personnel, and support staff.
EQUIPMENT	
2.3-E1	Ensure terminals at the Fusion Center and key law enforcement and public safety agencies across the region have access to information sharing networks, including federal classified networks where appropriate.
2.3-E2	Provide and sustain information technology equipment to include computers, software and hardware for intelligence analysts.
TRAINING	
2.3-T1	Train permanent and assigned analytical staff at the fusion center on the intelligence cycle and on developing analytic products.

2.3-T2	When applicable, training will meet International Association of Law Enforcement Analytic Standards from Global Intelligence Working Group and the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (GIWG/IALEIA) based standards (basic, intermediate, advanced) and such other standards as required.
2.3-T3	Fusion center staff and law enforcement personnel will receive annual awareness training on relevant privacy and security rules, and regulations (28 CFR and any other relevant State statutes and regulations).
2.3-T4	Basic and advanced intelligence analysis training is provided for intelligence operations personnel (e.g., commanders/supervisors, officers, analysts).
2.3-T5	Provide analytic staff at the fusion center refresher training in analytical methods and practices.
EXERCISES	
2.3-Ex1	Conduct exercises to test the fusion center's ability to analyze, link, and disseminate timely and actionable intelligence to law enforcement and other public safety agencies in the region.

Objective 2.4 Enhance Intelligence Information Sharing and Dissemination

Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination is the multi-jurisdictional, multi-disciplinary exchange and dissemination of information and intelligence among the Federal, State, local, and tribal layers of government, the private sector, and citizens. The goal of sharing and dissemination is to facilitate the distribution of relevant, actionable, timely, and (preferably) declassified or unclassified information and/or intelligence that is updated frequently to the consumers who need it.

Objective 2.4 Outcome

Effective and timely sharing of information and intelligence occurs across Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, regional, and private sector entities across the Bay Area to achieve coordinated awareness of, prevention of, protection against, mitigation of, and response to a threatened or actual terrorist attack, major disaster, or other emergency within the Bay Area.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
2.4-P1	Develop or maintain plans and procedures for the dissemination and routing of information and intelligence received by law enforcement agencies from outside entities and develop governance and privacy manuals.

2.4-P2	Continue to develop Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLOs) across all disciplines in the Bay Area with a particular emphasis on developing Health, Medical and Emergency Management TLOs.
2.4-P3	Develop plans and protocols for the sharing of public health and medical information between the fusion center and the public health and medical community to include disease surveillance information.
2.4-P4	Develop plans and SOPs for intelligence sharing between the fusion center and mass transit systems across the Bay Area.
2.4-P5	Ensure the private sector and public works agencies are a part of the intelligence and information sharing process across the Bay Area.
2.4-P6	Ensure the fusion center has an up to date continuity of operations plan (COOP).
ORGANIZATION	
2.4-O1	The fusion center will develop a policy and process to raise awareness of the fusion center and its mission with policy makers, elected officials, first responders, community leaders and the general public.
2.4-O2	The fusion center will develop a process to receive stakeholder feedback on all parts of the intelligence cycle to include feedback on training and exercises on intelligence and infrastructure protection.
EQUIPMENT	
2.4-E1	Video Teleconferencing Equipment and bridges for multi-site information sharing conferencing.
2.4-E2	Acquire and sustain information sharing systems.
TRAINING	
2.4-T1	Personnel are aware of, and trained to adhere to, pre-defined security clearances and need-to-know parameters.
2.4-T2	Personnel are trained in the process for preventing, reporting, and addressing the inappropriate disclosure of information and/or intelligence.
2.4-T3	All appropriate law enforcement personnel to be trained on the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC) Outreach Package and promote the concept of intelligence-led policing as outlined in the CICC Outreach Package.

EXERCISES	
2.4-Ex1	Exercises to test alternative, supplemental, and back-up mechanisms for routing information and/or intelligence to the necessary agencies in an emergency.
2.4-Ex2	Exercises to test the process for preventing, reporting, and addressing the inappropriate disclosure of information and/or intelligence.

Objective 2.5 Increase Critical Infrastructure Protection

The Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) capability enables public and private entities to identify, assess, prioritize, and protect critical infrastructure and key resources so they can detect, prevent, deter, devalue, and mitigate deliberate efforts to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit critical infrastructure and key resources.

Objective 2.5 Outcome

The Bay Area has a management and coordination structure overseen by the fusion center for its CIP program that includes inventorying CIKR from across the region, cataloging the dependencies and interdependencies of such CIKR and assessing the risks to the region's CIKR. Upon assessing risk the Bay Area prioritizes CIKR based on risk and sets out a suite of actions to reduce the vulnerability of, and consequence of an attack on its CIKR. This process is evaluated using metrics and other evaluation procedures at the CIKR sector levels to measure progress and to assess effectiveness of the CIKR protection program in the region.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
2.5-P1	Develop a Bay Area CI/KR protection plan modeled on the National Infrastructure Protection Plan that includes metrics and measures for the CI/KR program.
2.5-P2	Identify and catalogue by NIPP sector and sub-sector all high risk CI/KR present at the regional, sub-regional and jurisdictional level in a secure web-based system.
2.5-P3	Ensure all high risk CI/KR at the regional, sub-regional and jurisdictional level undergoes a vulnerability assessment.
2.5-P4	Within the fusion center, develop a plan to collect, analyze and map suspicious activity reports against CI/KR that may be indicators of terrorist pre-attack surveillance.

2.5-P5	Develop a methodology to prioritize CI/KR at the regional, sub-regional and jurisdictional level.
2.5-P6	Fully integrate mass transit and maritime ports across the Bay Area region into the security planning and communication and notification process at the fusion center and the UASI.
2.5-P7	Work with the private sector and other owners and operators of high risk CI/KR to encourage their developing continuity of operations plans (COOP).
2.5-P8	Evaluate the methods of conducting a potential study of interdependencies of critical infrastructure and key resources in the Bay Area.
ORGANIZATION	
2.5-O1	Fully integrate the intelligence and CI/KR protection functions through a process at the fusion center by collecting, analyzing and sharing threats to CI/KR, in order to review intelligence data and map threats against CI/KR, and major public events, determining the threatened infrastructure's vulnerability, and recommending a suite of protective measures and other resources to mitigate the risk posed by the threat.
2.5-O2	Develop and utilize sector coordinating council(s) for high risk infrastructure in the Bay Area.
EQUIPMENT	
2.5-E1	Acquire devices that utilize biometric characteristics (fingerprints, palm prints, retinal scanning, etc.) to authorize access to facilities and/or systems.
2.5-E2	Acquire Geospatial/Geographical Information Systems including application software as well as integrated hardware for implementation.
2.5-E3	Physical security enhancement equipment for high risk CI/KR.
2.5-E4	Cyber security equipment to protect cyber networks and systems.
2.5-E5	CBRNE detection equipment in and around CI/KR across the Bay Area.
TRAINING	
2.5-T1	Develop and implement risk and vulnerability assessment training at the fusion center and jurisdictional level.
2.5-T2	Develop and implement a comprehensive Process Control/Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) cyber security awareness, education, and training program for the owners/operators of SCADA-controlled CI/KR within the Bay Area.

EXERCISES	
2.5-Ex1	Develop and conduct exercise programs to test CI/KR protection plans to include CI/KR protection measures and technology across the Bay Area to test the effectiveness of protection.

GOAL 3	Mission Area(s)	National Priorities	Target Capabilities	State Strategy
ENHANCE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES	Common	Strengthen Interoperable and Operable Communications Implement the NIMS/NRF Enhance Regional Collaboration	Communications	Goal 3: Strengthen Communications Capabilities

The National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP)

Produced in 2007, DHS's *National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP)* establishes a comprehensive national vision for the future state of emergency communications. The desired future state is that emergency responders can communicate: as needed, on demand, and as authorized; at all levels of government; across all disciplines.

The *NECP* established three strategic goals:

- **Goal 1:** By 2010, 90 percent of all high-risk urban areas designated within the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) are able to demonstrate response-level emergency communications within one hour for routine events involving multiple jurisdictions and agencies.
- **Goal 2:** By 2011, 75 percent of non-UASI jurisdictions are able to demonstrate response-level emergency communications within one hour for routine events involving multiple jurisdictions and agencies.
- **Goal 3:** By 2013, 75 percent of all jurisdictions are able to demonstrate response-level emergency communications within three hours.

In 2010, according to the DHS Office of Emergency Communications, which oversees the *NECP* and conducted assessments of 60 Urban Areas, Goal 1 has been met. The Bay Area successfully participated in the 2010 national assessment:

Bay Area Regional Interoperable Communications System

The Bay Area is currently deploying a region-wide, standards-based, communication “system of systems” that supports first responder communication needs for local and regional agencies and interoperates with state and federal public safety agencies and designated public service organizations operating within the Bay Area region. The Bay Area will accomplish this by

Adopted by the Approval Authority on 01.12.12

implementing its 2008 strategic plan for achieving interoperable communications and by coordinating its efforts with the goals and objectives of the California Statewide Communications Interoperability Plan (CalSCIP).

To enhance communications generally, and achieve interoperable communications specifically, the region has developed the concept of a “system of systems” known as the Bay Area Regional Interoperable Communications System (BayRICS). In August 2011, the region established the BayRICS Authority, a joint powers authority charged with governance of regional interoperable communications systems generally, and specifically oversight of the Bay Area Enhanced Wireless Broadband (BayWEB), a regional broadband network that will eventually serve as a platform for fully interoperable voice, data and video communications throughout the region.

While BayRICS is a core element of achieving the strategic goal of enhancing communications and interoperable communications, there are other elements to achieving this goal that may fall outside the BayRICS program, but nonetheless fill a necessary capability gap associated with this goal in order to reduce risk.

Objective 3.1: Enhance Communications Capabilities

Communications is the fundamental capability within disciplines and jurisdictions that practitioners need to perform the most routine and basic elements of their job functions. Agencies must be operable, meaning they must have sufficient wireless communications to meet their everyday internal and emergency communication requirements before they place value on being interoperable, i.e., able to work with other agencies. In addition, emergency communications today requires not only mission critical voice systems, but also broadband data systems to support transmission of text, photos, video and other large digital files to and from first responders in the field.

Objective 3.1 Outcome

A continuous flow of critical information, both mission critical voice and broadband data, is maintained as needed among multi-jurisdictional and multidisciplinary emergency responders, command posts, agencies, and Bay Area governmental officials for the duration of the emergency response operation in compliance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS). The Bay Area has a continuity of operations plan for public safety communications including the consideration of critical components, networks, support systems, personnel, and an appropriate level of redundant communications systems in the event of an emergency. In addition, BayWEB operates as a redundant, resilient and hardened network that remains operable during emergencies.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements:

PLANNING	
3.1-P1	Complete an interagency communication process baseline report (also known as a business process baseline report) for each agency, operational area and sub-region that defines processes required to achieve interoperable communications within and between agencies. Reassess each Operational Area's current level of ability in the interoperable voice communications area to determine how the Bay Area region should move forward in planning and investing. The larger regional interoperability strategy will emphasize completing existing voice communications projects while laying the ground work for future data communications.
3.1-P2	Update as necessary the Bay Area Interoperable Voice Communications Strategic Plan based upon the assessment.
3.1-P3	Ensure all Tactical Interoperable Communications Plans (TICP) in the region are fully up to date. Evaluate the possibility of developing a repository of all Bay Area TICPs for easy access for public safety policy makers.
3.1-P4	Ensure After Action plans are developed and reviewed at the county/operational area and/or sub-regional and regional level to evaluate the effectiveness of communications mobilization and demobilization activities.
3.1-P5	Coordinate with and support BayRICS Authority efforts to integrate broadband data and video communications into regional interoperable communications plan.
3.1-P6	Develop a Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) that ensures continued operation of local and regional public safety communications nets during an incident response.
3.1-P7	Ensure incident commanders and first responders have awareness of primary and secondary systems and peripheral equipment for interoperable emergency communications.
ORGANIZATION	
3.1-O1	Provide limited initial funding for a Bay Area Regional Communications Coordinator position within the region to provide administrative support and to facilitate the regional approach to Interoperable Communications with an emphasis on mission critical voice communication while laying the ground work for future data communications. This person will liaison with the surrounding regions (CAP-BAY) and the State of California on technical issues as necessary.

3.1-O2	Ensure incident commanders and first responders have awareness of primary and secondary systems and peripheral equipment for interoperable emergency communications.
EQUIPMENT	
3.1-E1	Manage, enhance and sustain the digital microwave network and other high speed data transport networks to support interoperability efforts in the Bay Area to link the various interoperability projects across the Bay Area to include redundant systems such as BayLoop.
3.1-E2	Develop a regional fiber optic backhaul network and transition regional interoperable communications infrastructure from microwave to fiber technology.
3.1-E3	Enhance BayWEB coverage through addition of communications equipment or backhaul to improve coverage and performance in areas that demonstrate significant need.
3.1-E4	Other authorized communications equipment (e.g., equipment that allows for voice operability, voice interoperability, and then data) as mutually agreed upon by all partners.
TRAINING	
3.1-T1	Ensure each county/operational area has at least four people trained as Communications Unit Leaders (COML).
3.1-T2	Provide hybrid training on the interoperability communications protocols, tools and efforts to include data, video and multimedia applications and TICPs so as to ensure that responders are prepared to work in the shared environments.
EXERCISES	
3.1-Ex1	Conduct TICP exercises at jurisdictional levels.
3.1-Ex2	Use exercise scenarios that test multi-agency communication for the purpose of validating joint standard operating procedures (SOPs) for emergencies and regional communications SOPs.
3.1-Ex3	Continue to test and evaluate the region's first responders in the use of plain language during appropriate incidents.

GOAL 4	Mission Area(s)	National Priorities	Target Capabilities	State Strategy
STRENGTHEN CBRNE/WMD DETECTION, RESPONSE AND DECONTAMINATION CAPABILITIES	Prevention Response	Strengthen CBRNE Detection, Response, and Decontamination Capabilities	Fire Incident Response Support Search and Rescue CBRNE Detection Explosive Device Response Operations Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution WMD/Haz Mat Response and Decontamination On-site Incident Management Responder Safety and Health Emergency Public Safety and Security Response	Goal 5: Strengthen Catastrophic CBRNE and All Hazards Incident Planning, Detection and Response Capabilities

CBRNE Overview

Chemicals, biological pathogens, radiological substances, unshielded nuclear material, and explosives, whether used as weapons of mass destruction by terrorists or released during natural disasters or industrial accidents, pose a significant threat to human life and safety. Building the capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) incidents is a priority for the Bay Area and requires a broad range of capabilities to achieve this goal.

In 2008, the Bay Area developed a CBRNE Assessment and Strategic Plan. In doing so, the Bay Area assessed regional capabilities to respond to a range of CBRNE events, including sabotage, terrorism, and industrial accidents. The Bay Area then developed response benchmarks, identified and prioritized gaps in response capabilities, and developed a 5-year strategic plan that categorizes and prioritizes required resources to eliminate the gaps.

The CBRNE plan was intended to provide a blueprint that will assist the Bay Area in making resource allocation decisions to procure the most critical and cost-effective resources by purchase, lease, or other mechanism, so that a wide range of response capabilities will be enhanced for a CBRNE event. While that blueprint largely focuses on response capabilities it nonetheless serves as a critical guide for the implementation of this strategic goal.

In addition to the CBRNE plan, the Bay Area also completed a search and rescue training and exercise mandate plan. The plan sets out resource types, credentialing, state guidance, and specific training courses in the area of search and rescue for the region. As with the CBRNE plan, the training and exercise mandate plays an important implementation role as it relates to search and rescue during a CBRNE event.

Objective 4.1 Enhance Fire Incident Response Support Operations

This capability provides coordination and implementation of fire suppression operations, which includes assessing the scene, assigning resources, establishing an incident command system (ICS) consistent with the NIMS/SEMS, communicating the status of the situation, requesting additional resources, establishing a safe perimeter, evacuating persons in danger, rescuing trapped victims, conducting fire suppression, determining the cause of the fire(s), and ensuring the area is left in a safe condition.

Objective 4.1 Outcome

Dispatch and safe arrival of the initial fire suppression resources occurs within jurisdictional response time objectives. The first unit to arrive initiates the Incident Command System (ICS), assesses the incident scene, communicates the situation, and requests appropriate resources including any necessary mutual aid or cross-discipline support. Firefighting activities are conducted safely and fire hazards are contained, controlled, extinguished, and investigated, and the incident is managed in accordance with local and state response plans and procedures.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
4.1-P1	Develop plans, programs, and agreements on fire-related public safety protection activities, including region-wide mutual aid response protocols.
4.1-P2	Develop firefighting plans and procedures to address ICS with a particular focus on unified command for multi-agency events and ensure they are integrated with onsite incident management.
4.1-P3	Develop plans, procedures, and equipment guidelines to support firefighting response operations with an emphasis on a CBRNE event.
4.1-P4	Develop specialized plans for CBRNE events involving mass transit.
4.1-P5	Ensure plans and agreements are in place for access to aerial units for deployment to roofs or high-rises.
4.1-P6	Develop plans for establishing alternative water supply.

ORGANIZATION	
4.1-O1	Ensure fire scene investigators are in place where necessary.
4.1-O2	Develop unified command structures under NIMS/SEMS/ICS for multi-agency events.
EQUIPMENT	
4.1-E1	Acquire and maintain authorized firefighting equipment as agreed to by the region.
TRAINING	
4.1-T1	Develop and implement training to enable fire rescue and emergency medical services to recognize the presence of CBRNE materials.
4.1-T2	Conduct training in unified command structure and process under NIMS/SEMS/ICS for multi-agency events.
EXERCISES	
4.1-Ex1	Conduct exercises to test and evaluate fire incident response involving multiple disciplines.

Objective 4.2 Increase Search and Rescue Capabilities

Search and Rescue is the capability to coordinate and conduct search and rescue (S&R) response efforts for all hazards, including searching affected areas for victims (human and, to the extent no humans remain endangered, animal) and locating, accessing, medically stabilizing, and extricating victims from the damaged area.

Objective 4.2 Outcome

The greatest number of victims within the Bay Area (human and, to the extent that no humans remain endangered, animal) are rescued and transferred to medical or mass care capabilities, in the shortest amount of time, while maintaining rescuer safety.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
4.2-P1	Implement the CBRNE strategic plan as it relates to search and rescue.
4.2-P2	Develop plans, protocols and SOPs for S&R operations involving most common incidents requiring S&R.
4.2-P3	Develop plans and protocols for 100% of S&R task force personnel to be debriefed before leaving the scene.

4.2-P4	Develop plans and protocols for the base of operations to return to original condition within 12 hours from the start of the demobilization process.
4.2-P5	Develop plans and protocols for equipment caches to be re-inventoried and packaged for transport within 12 hours from start of demobilization.
ORGANIZATION	
4.2-O1	Continue to integrate EMS into S&R teams across the region.
EQUIPMENT	
4.2-E1	Acquire and sustain search and rescue equipment.
4.2-E2	Acquire and sustain personal protective equipment for S&R teams.
4.2-E3	Acquire and sustain medical equipment for search and rescue teams.
4.2-E4	Acquire and sustain search and rescue watercraft.
4.2-E5	Acquire and sustain search and rescue aviation equipment
4.2-E6	Personal identification systems
TRAINING	
4.2-T1	Update the Bay Area's search and rescue training mandates.
4.2-T2	Conduct training for S&R reconnaissance teams to provide preliminary recommendations on search priorities and strategy within 1 hour of an incident.
4.2-T3	Conduct training for the base of operations to return to original conditions within 12 hours from start of demobilization process.
4.2-T4	Conduct training for equipment caches to be re-inventoried and packaged for transport within 12 hours from the start of demobilization.
4.2-T5	Provide training for large scale S&R operations to including gridding the search area.
EXERCISES	
4.2-Ex1	Update the Bay Area's search and rescue exercise mandates.

Objective 4.3 Strengthen CBRNE Detection

The CBRNE Detection capability includes the identification and communication of CBRNE threats, but does not include actions taken to prevent an incident or respond to the consequences of a CBRNE incident, which are addressed in other prevention capabilities. It involves the ability to detect CBRNE materials at points of manufacture, transportation, and use. This capability includes the detection of CBRNE material through area monitoring, but does not include detection by their effects (i.e., signs or symptoms) on humans and animals. Such population level monitoring is addressed, respectively, in the Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation objective.

Objective 4.3 Outcome

The Bay Area has the ability to rapidly detect and identify chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and/or explosive (CBRNE) materials at borders and ports of entry, CI/KR locations, events, and incidents and can communicate CBRNE detection and warning information to appropriate entities and authorities.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
4.3-P1	Develop plans and protocols for the fusion center to notify appropriate personnel of CBRNE detection data and results.
4.3-P2	Develop intelligence and risk-based CBRNE detection deployment protocols for major events, mass transit and other high profile events and CI/KR.
4.3-P3	Develop records management protocol at the fusion center for all CBRNE issues or alarms and their resolution.
4.3-P4	Develop plans and protocols to acquire and distribute CBRNE detection equipment to large numbers of first responders.
4.3-P5	Sustain and update plans and protocols among laboratories across the region for public information regarding CBRNE detection.
4.3-P6	Ensure the region's radiological/nuclear detection plans and protocols are fully integrated with the State's preventive rad/nuke detection program.
ORGANIZATION	
4.3-O1	CBRNE Detection operator/personnel specially trained and equipped with the ability to recognize potential CBRNE threats through equipment, education, and effective protocols are in place.
4.3-O2	Ensure laboratories across the region are adequately staffed for agent identification.

EQUIPMENT	
4.3-E1	Equipment listed in the CBRNE spending plan.
4.3-E2	CBRNE Inspection, detection and screening systems equipment for deployment at pre-determined sites across the region such as seaports, airports, water supply, mass transit, etc.
4.3-E3	Agricultural terrorism prevention, response, and mitigation equipment
TRAINING	
4.3-T1	Appropriate personnel have been identified for CBRNE detection training (e.g., law enforcement, transit police and security, fire department, hazardous materials (HazMat), public health, private sector security, and critical infrastructure personnel).
4.3-T2	Awareness level training for first responders and CIKR personnel for each of the CBRNE agents.
4.3-T3	Public education campaigns for CBRNE detection.
4.3-T4	Training for detection operators, laboratory staff, and CIKR protection personnel.
EXERCISES	
4.3-Ex1	A program to test and evaluate new CBRNE technology in the appropriate operational environment is made part of the overall exercise and evaluation program.

Objective 4.4 Enhance Explosive Device Response Operations

Explosive Device Response Operations is the capability to coordinate, direct, and conduct improvised explosive device (IED) response after initial alert and notification. Coordinate intelligence fusion and analysis, information collection, and threat recognition, assess the situation and conduct appropriate render safe procedures.

Objective 4.4 Outcome

On-scene threat assessments are conducted by bomb squads, search priorities and tactics are determined, the explosive and/or hazardous devices are located and rendered safe, and the area is cleared of hazards.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
4.4-P1	Engage the US Department of Homeland Security Office of Bombing Prevention for the purpose of conducting a Multi-Jurisdictional Improvised Explosive Device Security Planning assessment.
4.4-P2	Ensure all bomb squads in the Bay Area are accredited by the FBI to standards set by the National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board.
4.4-P3	Develop and sustain plans, tactics, techniques, and procedures to respond to vehicle borne improvised explosive devices.
4.4-P4	Develop and sustain plans, tactics, techniques, and procedures to respond to radio-controlled, improvised explosive devices
4.4-P5	Develop and sustain plans, tactics, techniques, and procedures to respond to suicide bombers.
4.4-P6	Using a risk-based approach, evaluate those high-risk or particularly vulnerable locations in the Bay Area that might be beyond a 1-hour response time frame, and assess potential for acquiring and pre-deploying additional explosive device response equipment.
ORGANIZATION	
4.4-O1	Ensure full use of the DHS Office of Bombing Prevention information-sharing portal, the Technical Resource for Incident Prevention (TRIPwire), and the ATF's clearing house (Bomb Arson Tracking System (BATS)).
EQUIPMENT	
4.4-E1	Obtain and sustain equipment as outlined in the CBRNE strategic plan.
4.4-E2	Acquire and sustain necessary jamming and other EDRO equipment.

4.4-E3	Based on assessment results, acquire, pre-deploy and sustain necessary explosive device response equipment for high-risk sites outside a 1-hour response time frame.
TRAINING	
4.4-T1	Provide explosive identification, response and mitigation training to first responders.
4.4-T2	Ensure all bomb squad training (including techniques, tactics, and procedures) is consistent with and enhances training delivered by the FBI Hazardous Devices School (HDS).
4.4-T3	Ensure effective tactics, techniques, procedures, and training are standardized and shared within the bomb squad community.
4.4-T4	Deliver training for responding to radio controlled improvised explosive devices.
4.4-T5	Deliver training for responding to suicide bombers.
4.4-T6	Deliver training for responding to vehicle borne improvised explosive devices.
4.4-T7	Provide general public and private sector with bomb threat awareness training as needed.
4.4-T8	Ensure that all necessary law enforcement personnel are provided sufficient support and opportunities for continuing/refresher education and explosive device response training.
EXERCISES	
4.4-Ex1	Ensure explosive device response operations, to include responding to a VBIED, IED, waterborne IED and other scenarios are incorporated into exercise programs.

Objective 4.5 Increase Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution Capabilities

Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution is the capability to identify, inventory, dispatch, mobilize, transport, recover, demobilize and accurately track and record available human and material critical resources throughout all incident management phases. Critical resources are those necessary to preserve life, property, safety, and security.

Objective 4.5 Outcome

Critical resources are coordinated and tracked by local EOCs and made available to incident managers and emergency responders from across the Bay Area upon request for proper distribution and to aid disaster victims in a cost-effective and timely manner.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
4.5-P1	In coordination with the State, develop a comprehensive region-wide system of resource typing, inventoried resources and credentialing (Metrics Project) so as to provide emergency managers and incident commanders and first responders the ability to locate, track and request needed resources in a coordinated and effective manner.
4.5-P2	Develop critical resource management plans supported by standing contracts and/or emergency purchase mechanisms such as credit cards or debit cards.
4.5-P3	Develop plans and procedures to address activation of the resource management system.
4.5-P4	Create plans, procedures, and systems to pre-position resources in order to efficiently and effectively respond to an event.
4.5-P5	Develop standardized procedures for utilizing Law Enforcement Online Virtual Command Center to assist with logistics operations.
ORGANIZATION	
4.5-O1	Ensure a logistics planning manager for regional coordination of logistics operations and planning.
4.5-O2	Pre-negotiate vendor contracts for critical resources and essential services.
EQUIPMENT	
4.5-E1	Acquire and sustain CBRNE logistical support equipment.

TRAINING	
4.5-T1	Develop and deliver training in emergency logistics that incorporates linkages among damage/needs assessment, logistics management, and volunteer/donations management.
EXERCISES	
4.5-Ex1	Test and evaluate resource and logistic tracking and recording.

Objective 4.6 Increase WMD/Haz Mat Response and Decontamination

WMD and Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination is the capability to assess and manage the consequences of a hazardous materials release, either accidental or as part of a terrorist attack.

Objective 4.6 Outcome

Within the Bay Area, a hazardous materials release is rapidly identified and mitigated; victims exposed to the hazard are rescued, decontaminated, and treated; the impact of the release is limited; and responders and at-risk populations are effectively protected.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
4.6-P1	Develop plans, programs, agreements, and requirements for responding to hazardous material incidents.
4.6-P2	Develop plans, programs, criteria, and protocols for conducting decontamination.
4.6-P3	Develop SOPs for integration of fire personnel and tactical teams.
4.6-P4	Ensure fire service has plans and procedures in place to decontaminate equipment and resources during a WMD/HazMat response.
4.6-P5	Ensure plans and procedures are in place to decontaminate deceased bodies during a WMD/HazMat response.
ORGANIZATION	
4.6-O1	Pre-identify resources (personnel and equipment) to provide rapid initial size-up of hazardous materials incident.

EQUIPMENT	
4.6-E1	Procure equipment per the CBRNE plan.
4.6-E2	Acquire and sustain decontamination equipment.
TRAINING	
4.6-T1	Ensure police, fire, EMS and first responders (other than those assigned to hazmat responses) are trained to hazmat awareness level.
4.6-T2	Provide hazmat operations, specialist, technician and manager training and ensure that such training is to the appropriate hazmat level and NFPA standard.
4.6-T3	Provide WMD/HazMat/IED awareness level training and refresher training to a broad audience of the region's first responders.
4.6-T4	Ensure hazmat team(s) trains regularly with EMS to ensure proper coordination of victim care post-decontamination (identification of substance, administration of antidotes, etc.).
4.6-T5	Develop and implement training related to detection, identification and reporting of hazardous material.
4.6-T6	Provide appropriate hazmat response or refresher training to field staff and managers having involvement in hazmat response.
4.6-T7	Conduct training for integration of fire personnel and tactical team response operations.
4.6-T8	Conduct training for fire service on procedures to decontaminate equipment and resources during a WMD/HazMat response.
4.6-T9	Provide WMD/HazMat response and mitigation training to law enforcement personnel as needed.
EXERCISES	
4.6-Ex1	Develop and implement exercise programs for WMD/hazardous materials response and decontamination.
4.6-Ex2	Exercise CBRNE/WMD/HazMat capabilities and equipment into regional and statewide exercise opportunities.

Objective 4.7 Strengthen On-site Incident Management

Onsite Incident Management is the capability to effectively direct and control incident activities by using the Incident Command System (ICS) consistent with NIMS/SEMS.

Objective 4.7 Outcome

Within the Bay Area, an incident is managed safely, effectively and efficiently through the common framework of the Incident Command System including the use of incident action plans and the tracking of on-site resources.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
4.7-P1	Develop and maintain plans and standard operating procedures (SOPs) for emergency response operations within each jurisdiction.
4.7-P2	Develop jurisdiction emergency management plans and SOPs that are compatible and integrate support for unified command during multi agency or multi-jurisdictional operations.
4.7-P3	Pre-identify resources available to supplement command and control capabilities.
4.7-P4	Ensure resource and personnel tracking system(s) is place in coordination with the critical resource logistics and distribution objective.
4.7-P5	Develop policies and procedures for utilizing the Law Enforcement Online Virtual Command Center capability.
4.8-P6	Develop regional plans and procedures to address ICS with a particular focus on unified command for multi-agency events and ensure they are integrated with onsite incident management.
ORGANIZATION	
4.7-O1	Develop or maintain Type I or II or III or IV incident management team.
4.7-O2	Establish SOPs for addressing staffing issues that area commands cannot address during an incident.
TRAINING	
4.7-T1	Ensure all appropriate personnel are trained in NIMS/SEMS incident command and unified command.
4.7-T2	Train personnel in accordance with NIMS/SEMS typing.
4.7-T3	Establish and maintain ICS training benchmarks and metrics and integrate them with relevant regional training plans.
4.7-T4	Provide training on the use of the Law Enforcement Online Virtual Command Center capability.

EXERCISES	
4.7-Ex1	Exercise personnel in accordance with NIMS/SEMS typing
4.7-Ex2	Test to ensure all on-site management activities are coordinated through the Incident Command System with a focus on testing and evaluating unified command.
4.7-Ex3	Test whether formal operational briefings are conducted at the start of each operational period.
4.7-Ex4	Test whether IAP is re-assessed, revised, distributed, and briefed at least at the start of each new operational period.
4.7-Ex5	Test whether incident objectives are accomplished through strategic and tactical actions.

Objective 4.8 Increase Responder Safety and Health

Responder Safety and Health is the capability that ensures adequately trained and equipped personnel and resources are available at the time of an incident to protect the safety and health of on scene first responders, hospital/medical facility personnel (first receivers), and skilled support personnel through the creation and maintenance of an effective safety and health program.

Objective 4.8 Outcome

The risk of illnesses or injury to any Bay Area first responder, first receiver, medical facility staff member, or other skilled support personnel as a result of preventable exposure to secondary trauma, chemical/radiological release, infectious disease, or physical and emotional stress after the initial incident or during decontamination and incident follow-up is significantly reduced.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
4.8-P1	Develop and adopt agency/jurisdiction safety and health plans and program(s).
4.8-P2	Conduct a detailed analysis of relevant planning scenarios to ensure that all workers are protected while performing tasks from all hazards.
ORGANIZATION	
4.8-O1	Establish plans and procedures for identifying sources of additional equipment and expertise if the safety and health program is overwhelmed.

EQUIPMENT	
4.8-E1	Acquire and sustain authorized personal protective equipment as agreed to by the region to include SCBA, auto injectors, etc.
TRAINING	
4.8-T1	Provide training on acquired PPE.
EXERCISES	
4.8-Ex1	Integrate responder health and safety into exercises to develop and maintain appropriate health and safety knowledge and expertise for responders.

Objective 4.9 Strengthen Emergency Public Safety and Security Response

Emergency Public Safety and Security Response is the capability to reduce the impact and consequences of an incident or major event by securing the affected area, including crime/incident scene preservation issues as appropriate, safely diverting the public from hazards, providing security support to other response operations, such as fire, EMS, public works and sanitation, etc., and properties; and sustaining overall operations from response through recovery.

Objective 4.9 Outcome

Public safety agencies within the Bay Area are able to keep the public and critical infrastructure safe; secure the particular incident scene; and maintain law and order following an incident or emergency to include managing the criminal justice prisoner population.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
4.9-P1	Ensure MOUs and/or mutual aid agreements are in place to ensure law enforcement and other public safety operations can be conducted across jurisdictions.
4.9-P2	Develop plans and systems to maintain accountability of public safety personnel, track incident locations, and track resources.
4.9-P3	Develop activation and deployment plans for public safety and security with plans targeting 50 percent of total uniformed (patrol) staff of a jurisdiction having primary responsibility for the incident.
4.9-P4	Develop plans and protocols for alternate facilities for court services, prisoner holding and housing, prisoner transport, criminal intake and other criminal justice services.
4.9-P5	Develop plans for staging areas for law enforcement prior to entering site or policing a jurisdiction.

4.9-P6	Ensure plans for sheltering, housing, and feeding law enforcement and other public safety personnel are in place.
ORGANIZATION	
4.9-O1	Develops to ensure Law enforcement, National Guard and private security teams for crowd and traffic control are consistent with NIMS/SEMS
EQUIPMENT	
4.9-E1	Acquire and sustain crowd and traffic control equipment.
4.9-E2	Acquire and sustain power equipment.
TRAINING	
4.9-T1	Develop and conduct public safety and security training programs to include joint local, state and federal teams pursuant to ESF 13 under the NRF
EXERCISES	
4.9-Ex1	Test and evaluate public safety and security teams' activation and deployment capabilities.
4.9-Ex2	Test and evaluate criminal justice re-location plans.

GOAL 5	Mission Area(s)	National Priorities	Target Capabilities	State Strategy
ENHANCE MEDICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS	Protection Response Recovery	Strengthen Medical Surge and Mass Prophylaxis Capabilities	Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Medical Surge Mass Prophylaxis Medical Supplies Management and Distribution Isolation and Quarantine Laboratory Testing Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation Fatality Management	Goal 6: Improve Medical and Health Preparedness

Public Health and Medical Background

Health and medical preparedness is a fundamental component of homeland security. This fact is evidenced by the 2001 anthrax attacks, the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and the 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak. Given such risks, the Bay Area must ensure its medical and public health infrastructure is capable of protecting against, responding to, and recovering from such events.

At the National level, the Department of Health and Human Services has led the way with the creation of the National Health Security Strategy (NHSS), released in December 2009. The NHSS is designed to achieve two overarching goals:

- Build community resilience, and
- Strengthen and sustain health and emergency response systems.

As with the Bay Area Homeland Security Strategy, the NHSS is designed around building health and medical capabilities in order to achieve strategic goals and objectives based on the elements of plans, organization, equipment, training, and exercises. As the Federal Government continues to develop implementation plans for the NHSS, the Bay Area will track federal guidance and

integrate, where appropriate, such guidance into local and regional health and medical preparedness efforts.

In enhancing medical and public health preparedness, the Bay Area seeks to develop a comprehensive and integrated system of first responders, hospitals, clinics, and public health departments across the region. This includes fully integrating the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) in the Bay Area.

Finally, the region's CBRNE plan also plays a critical role relative to this strategic goal as several objectives within the plan cover medical and health preparedness concerning a CBRNE event. Jurisdictions and sub-regions should therefore, look to the CBRNE plan for additional guidance in this area.

Objective 5.1 Enhance Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment

Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment is the capability to appropriately dispatch emergency medical services (EMS) resources; to provide feasible, suitable, and medically acceptable pre-hospital triage and treatment of patients; to provide transport as well as medical care en-route to an appropriate receiving facility; and to track patients at treatment facilities.

Objective 5.1 Outcome

EMS resources across the Bay Area are effectively and appropriately dispatched and provide pre-hospital triage, treatment, transport, tracking of patients, and documentation of care appropriate for the incident, while maintaining the capabilities of the EMS system for continued operations up to and including mass casualty.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
5.1-P1	Update local mass casualty plans and integrate local plans with the California Disaster Medical Operations Manual.
5.1-P2	Produce written plans and procedures for coordination of the local EMS system with the State and National Disaster Medical System.
5.1-P3	Develop protocols and procedures for tracking triage and pre-hospital treatment response staff and equipment during day-to-day operations, as well as catastrophic incidents.
EQUIPMENT	
5.1-E1	Acquire and sustain emergency medical equipment to include patient tracking systems and PPE.

TRAINING	
5.1-T1	Provide training on the California Public Health and Medical Emergency Operations Manual.
5.1-T2	Develop and implement multi-disciplinary training programs for EMS personnel, based on local risk vulnerability assessments and lessons learned.
5.1-T3	Conduct training for EMS and tactical team personnel in joint response events.
5.1-T4	Conduct training for dispatch personnel in protocols and procedures for dispatch during catastrophic events.
EXERCISES	
5.1-Ex1	Develop and implement multi-disciplinary exercise programs for EMS personnel, based on local risk assessments and lessons learned.
5.1-Ex2	Exercise EMS capabilities and equipment into regional and statewide exercise opportunities.

Objective 5.2 Increase Medical Surge

Medical Surge is the capability to rapidly expand the capacity of the existing healthcare system (long term care facilities, community health agencies, acute care facilities, alternate care facilities and public health departments) in order to provide triage and subsequent medical care as well as the management of fatality surges

Objective 5.1 Outcome

Those injured or ill from a medical disaster and/or mass casualty event in the Bay Area are rapidly and appropriately cared for. Continuity of care is maintained for non-incident related illness or injury.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
5.2-P1	Develop and maintain medical surge plans that integrate with State and hospital plans including patient distribution plans.
5.2-P2	Develop and maintain medical mutual aid agreements for medical facilities and equipment.
5.2-P3	Develop and maintain surge capacity plans for acute care hospitals.

5.2-P4	Update local mass casualty plans and integrate local plans with the California Disaster Health Operations Manual.
EQUIPMENT	
5.2-E1	Acquire and sustain medical equipment, supplies and pharmaceuticals to support medical surge operations.
TRAINING	
5.2-T1	Provide training on the California Public Health and Medical Emergency Operations Manual.
5.2-T2	Provide training on the California Healthcare Surge Standards and Guidelines for healthcare facilities.
EXERCISES	
5.2-Ex1	Test and evaluate medical surge plans.

Objective 5.3 Strengthen Mass Prophylaxis

Mass Prophylaxis is the capability to protect the health of the population through the administration of critical intervention in response to a public health emergency, (including the mass dispensation of medicine), in order to prevent the development of disease among those who are exposed to or are potentially exposed to public health threats.

Objective 5.3 Outcome

With the onset of an event, appropriate drug prophylaxis and vaccination strategies are implemented across the Bay Area in a timely manner to prevent the development of disease in exposed individuals. Public information strategies include recommendations on specific actions individuals can take to protect their family, friends, and themselves.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
5.3-P1	Develop and maintain plans, procedures, and protocols for mass prophylaxis dispensing operations.
5.3-P2	Develop procedures for obtaining mass prophylaxis supplies from the receipt, staging, and storage (RSS) sites in coordination with the Medical Supplies and Distribution Capability.
5.3-P3	Develop programs to ensure security of mass prophylaxis during dispensing operations.
5.3-P4	Develop processes to ensure that first responders, public health responses, critical infrastructure personnel, and their families receive prophylaxis prior to POD opening.
ORGANIZATION	
5.3-O1	Develop a mass prophylaxis inventory management system.
EQUIPMENT	
5.3-E1	Caches of medical supplies and strategic national stockpile (SNS) dispensing and distribution equipment.
TRAINING	
5.3-T1	Develop and implement training for mass prophylaxis operations.
5.3-T2	Develop and implement training for mass prophylaxis repacking, distribution, and dispensing, security of mass prophylaxis, and for mass prophylaxis inventory management.
EXERCISES	
5.3-Ex1	Conduct mass prophylaxis exercises program to test and evaluate all aspects of mass prophylaxis including distribution and dispensing, include, tactical communications, public information and communication, security, inventory management, distribution.

Objective 5.4 Improve Medical Supplies Management and Distribution

Medical Supplies Management and Distribution is the capability to procure and maintain pharmaceuticals and medical materials prior to an incident and to transport, distribute, and track these materials during an incident to those responders and providers in need of them.

Objective 5.4 Outcome

Critical medical supplies and equipment in the Bay Area are appropriately secured, managed, distributed to field responders and providers, and restocked in a timeframe appropriate to the incident and according to plan(s).

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
5.4-P1	Develop plans for establishing staging areas for internal and external medical response personnel, equipment, and supplies.
5.4-P2	Establish strategies for transporting materials through restricted areas, quarantine lines, law enforcement checkpoints and so forth that are agreed upon by all affected parties.
5.4-P3	Obtain demographic/health-related data to plan for the types of medications, durable medical equipment, or consumable medical supplies that may need to be provided during an event (including supplies needed for populations requiring functional or medical care).
TRAINING	
5.4-T1	Provide training on the demobilization of medical supplies.
5.4-T2	Provide training in medical supplies management and distribution in the pre hospital triage environment.
5.4-T3	Provide training on CDC supply tracking software.
EXERCISES	
5.4-Ex1	Exercise plans procedures and systems for transporting and tracking medical material assets with specific focus on the demobilization of medical supplies.

Objective 5.5 Strengthen Isolation and Quarantine

Isolation and Quarantine is the capability to protect the health of the population through the use of isolation and/or quarantine measures in order to contain the spread of disease. Isolation of ill individuals may occur in homes, hospitals, designated health care facilities, or alternate facilities. Quarantine refers to the separation and restriction of movement of persons who, while not yet ill, have been exposed to an infectious agent and may become infectious.

Objective 5.5 Outcome

Individuals in the Bay Area who are ill, exposed, or likely to be exposed are separated, movement is restricted, basic necessities of life are available, and their health is monitored in order to limit the spread of a newly introduced contagious disease (e.g., pandemic influenza). Legal authority for those measures is clearly defined and communicated to all responding agencies and the public. Logistical support is provided to maintain measures until danger of contagion has elapsed.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
5.5-P1	Ensure legal authority is in place for authorizing isolation and quarantine.
5.5-P2	Develop and maintain plans for coordinating quarantine activation and enforcement with public safety and law enforcement.
ORGANIZATION	
5.5-O1	Establish systems, programs, and resources for implementing isolation and quarantine.
TRAINING	
5.5-T1	Develop and implement exercises for isolation and quarantine.
EXERCISES	
5.5-Ex1	Exercises to test plans for implementing isolation and quarantine.

Objective 5.6 Improve Laboratory Testing

The Laboratory Testing capability is the ongoing surveillance, rapid detection, confirmatory testing, data reporting, investigative support, and laboratory networking that addresses the potential exposure, or actual exposure, to all-hazards which include chemical, radiological, and biological agents in all matrices including clinical specimens, food and environmental samples.

Objective 5.6 Outcome

Potential exposure to disease in the Bay Area is identified rapidly by determining exposure and mode of transmission and agent. Confirmed cases and laboratory results are reported immediately to all relevant public health, food regulatory, environmental regulatory, and law enforcement agencies in support of operations and investigations.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

ORGANIZATION	
5.6-O1	Identify, establish and maintain working collaboration with all Laboratory Response Network (LRN) Sentinel and LRN Clinical Chemistry laboratories.
5.6-O2	Develop and maintain an accurate and current database of contact information and capability for all the Laboratory Response Network (LRN) Sentinel and LRN Clinical Chemistry laboratories.
TRAINING	
5.6-T1	Train all LRN Sentinel laboratories in the use of LRN biological agent ruled-out protocols, specimens or isolate referral responsibilities and notification algorithms.
EXERCISES	
5.6-Ex1	Exercises to test select LRN sentinel and LRN clinical chemistry laboratories.

Objective 5.7 Strengthen Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation

The Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation capability includes exposure and disease (both deliberate release and naturally occurring) detection, rapid implementation of active surveillance, maintenance of ongoing surveillance activities, epidemiological investigation, analysis, and communication with the public and providers about case definitions, disease risk and mitigation, and recommendation for the implementation of control measures.

Objective 5.7 Outcome

Potential exposure to disease is identified rapidly in the Bay Area by determining disease exposure, mode of transmission and agent followed by the issuance and implementation of control measures to contain the spread of the event, thereby reducing the number of cases.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
5.7-P1	Develop plans, procedures, and protocols for investigating a potential disease outbreak.
5.7-P2	Develop and maintain procedures for identification of disease, vector and epidemic.
TRAINING	
5.7-T1	Training for staff on activities required to conduct epidemiological surveillance and detection including exposure and disease detection, surveillance, analysis, reporting, and use of equipment.
EXERCISES	
5.7-Ex1	Exercises to evaluate epidemiological surveillance and detection.

Objective 5.8 Enhance Fatality Management

Fatality Management is the capability to effectively perform scene documentation; the complete collection and recovery of the dead, victim's personal effects, and items of evidence; decontamination of remains and personal effects (if required); and transportation, storage, documentation, and recovery of forensic and physical evidence.

Objective 5.8 Outcome

Complete documentation, recovery and disposition of human remains and items of property and evidence takes place in the Bay Area following a disaster (except in cases where the health risks posed to personnel outweigh the benefits of recovery of remains).

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
5.8-P1	Update, as needed, the Bay Area Regional Catastrophic Incident Mass Fatality Plan.
5.8-P2	Ensure plans are in place to allow for the contracting or use of private sector resources in support of mass fatality to include the use of just in time contracts for body storage, etc.
EQUIPMENT	
5.8-E1	Acquire and sustain mass fatality equipment as called for in the Bay Area CBRNE Capability Assessment and Strategic Plan.
5.8-E2	Acquire authorized and needed body storage equipment as agreed to by the region.
TRAINING	
5.8-T1	Provide training on the implementation of the Bay Area Regional Catastrophic Incident Mass Fatality Plan.
5.8-T2	Conduct training on mass fatality equipment.
EXERCISES	
5.8-Ex1	Conduct exercises to test and evaluate the Bay Area Regional Catastrophic Incident Mass Fatality Plan across all phases – trauma, contamination and pandemic.

GOAL 6	Mission Area(s)	National Priorities	Target Capabilities	State Strategy
STRENGTHEN EMERGENCY PLANNING AND CITIZEN PREPAREDNESS CAPABILITIES	Response Recovery	Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities	EOC Management Emergency Public Information and Warning Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place Mass Care Community Preparedness and Participation Volunteer Management and Donations	Goal 4: Enhance Planning and Community Preparedness Capabilities

Community Preparedness and Emergency Operations

The Bay Area has long viewed emergency and community planning and preparedness as a core element of homeland security. In 2007-2008 the region developed a community preparedness program guide to help identify local best practices concerning social marketing programs as they relate to community preparedness, determine national best practices for citizen preparedness programs, and assess the effectiveness of the various characteristics of community preparedness programs available in the Bay Area. The program guide is a valuable tool to assist the region, sub-regions and jurisdictions in their development of community preparedness programs for all hazards. The program guide also serves as a key element and implementation tool for each of the objectives under this Strategic goal.

Effectively communicating threat or disaster risk, warnings, protective actions, and other information to the community continues to gain prominence as a critical element of keeping communities safe before, during, and after disasters. While researchers and practitioners have made significant strides towards identifying risks and establishing new technology protocols and solutions, the challenge of communicating alerts, warnings, and safety messages across multiple independent jurisdictions with a widely diverse population such as those in the Bay Area still needs to be addressed within the region.

Finally, an Emergency Operation Center (EOC) is a location from which centralized strategic management of an incident is performed. The EOC is a coordination point, not an incident scene command, control and management center; it does not provide tactical direction to field activities. The EOC may manage multiple incidents that have established Incident Command Posts. The EOC coordinates the delivery of resources to address conditions facing field

resources, communicates with the next highest level of level of government to provide information regarding the emergency and the acquisition of resources not readily available within the requesting level of government.

There are numerous EOCs in the Bay Area. Each OA in the region has an EOC as do several major cities, including the cities of Oakland and San Jose. When activated, an Operational Area EOC will coordinate mutual aid requests between the County, the Operational Area member jurisdictions, and the State Regional Emergency Operations Center (REOC).

EOCs in the region operate under the SEMS, the NIMS based system for emergency management and its five essential functions:

- Command or Management
- Operations
- Planning
- Logistics
- Finance

Objective 6.1 Enhance EOC Management

EOC Management is the capability to provide multi-agency coordination for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event.

Objective 6.1 Outcome

The EOC functions in accordance with the NIMS/SEMS, emergency plans and standard operating procedures; and plans, directs and coordinates information and activities internally within EOC functions, and externally with other multi-agency coordination entities, command posts and other public information systems such that the pre-planned or no-notice incident is effectively managed through multi-agency coordination.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
6.1-P1	Emergency operations plans, policies and procedures; Continuity of Operations/Continuity of Government (COOP/COG) plans are in place.
6.1-P2	Develop Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for activation, operation, and deactivation of jurisdictions' EOCs.
6.1-P3	Develop security and access control plans for jurisdictions' EOCs.

6.1-P4	Develop, adapt, or implement plans to support the incident command and unified command systems as needed within EOCs.
6.1-P5	Establish and implement an order of command succession or continuity consistent with NIMS/SEMS.
6.1-P6	Verify that all critical communication links/circuits/systems have been identified and regularly tested; redundant and diverse links exist in case of single point of failure; and all emergency circuits are protected with telecommunications service priority for prompt restoration/ provisioning.
6.1-P7	Ensure that primary and secondary means to establish and maintain communication services through the event timeline are in place, can be activated promptly, and can continue to operate at acceptable levels.
6.1-P8	Ensure Department Operations Centers (DOCs) and EOCs have IT staffing requirements in their activation plans.
6.1-P9	Ensure DOC and EOC staff coordinate and plan with general services administration personnel for long term support of operations center support.
6.1-P10	Revise EOC activations plans as necessary to include 24 hour staffing for finance support during an emergency.
6.1-P11	Ensure EOCs facilitate the regional reporting of activities, coordination of operational activities and the development of a common operating picture, during an incident and incorporate their communications requirements into local operational communications interoperability plans.
ORGANIZATION	
6.1-O1	Ensure the EOC consists of basic functional requirements, including: Management, Operations, Planning/Intelligence, Logistics, and Finance/Administration under NIMS/SEMS.
EQUIPMENT	
6.1-E1	Ensure DOCs have sufficient information technology equipment and software (WebEOC) that is standardized/interoperable
6.1-E2	Ensure EOCs have communications equipment.
6.1-E3	Acquire and sustain back up power equipment for EOCs as needed.
6.1-E4	Acquire and sustain physical security enhancement equipment for the EOCs as needed.
6.1-E5	Acquire and sustain inspection and screening systems at the EOC as necessary.

6.1-E6	Establish operational and redundant communication systems for jurisdictions' EOC operations.
TRAINING	
6.1-T1	Provide FEMA Independent Study Program: IS 700-NIMS, An Introduction; FEMA Independent Study Program: IS 800-National Response Plan, An Introduction; FEMA Independent Study Program: IS 275-EOC Management and Operations training.
6.1-T2	Provide FEMA Independent Study Program: IS 100-Introduction to Incident Command System; FEMA Independent Study Program: IS 200-ICS for Single Resources and Initial Action Incident training.
6.1-T3	Brief or train local chief executives and other key officials of the jurisdiction in the jurisdiction's command, control and coordination plans for large-scale emergencies.
6.1-T4	Establish and train appropriate personnel on standardized reporting format for area commands to utilize during briefings with EOCs and DOCs.
6.1-T5	Provide training to EOC personnel on the NIMS/ICS/SEMS and overall EOC functions and responsibilities in an emergency.
EXERCISES	
6.1-Ex1	Develop exercise program to evaluate the effectiveness EOC incident management processes; communications and standards, and exercise programs for emergency operations plans, policies and procedures.
6.1-Ex2	Utilize exercise program to test continuity of operations/continuity of government (COOP/COG) Plans for the EOC.

Objective 6.2 Strengthen Emergency Public Information and Warning Capabilities

The Emergency Public Information and Warning capability includes public information, alert/warning and notification. It involves developing, coordinating, and disseminating information to the public, and coordinating officials, incident management and responders across all jurisdictions and disciplines effectively under all hazard conditions.

Objective 6.2 Outcome

The Bay Area has an integrated system of systems involving government agencies, the general public, and the private sector that allows for the transmission of clear, specific, accurate, certain and consistent alerts and warnings to all appropriate recipients through Joint Information Centers, or other means, regarding threats to health, safety, and property.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements:

PLANNING	
6.2-P1	Conduct regional assessment of alert and warning capabilities and develop a regional alert, warning and notification strategic plan.
6.2-P2	Ensure Operational Area EOPs have an up to date alert and warning annex consistent with FEMA Comprehensive Planning Guidance 101.
6.2-P3	Develop policies and protocols for use of appropriate general and specific messaging to effectively communicate with first responders/providers and the public, with an emphasis on access and functional needs community members.
6.2-P4	Produce pre-scripted messages for high risk and highly common incidents for the region.
6.2-P5	Develop messaging, response and performance standards based on local, State and Federal models/guidelines, with an emphasis on access and functional needs populations.
ORGANIZATION	
6.2-O1	Public Affairs Teams consistent with ESF 15 under the NRF will be developed
6.2-O2	Plans for a Joint Information Center (JIC) include multi-jurisdictional, multi-disciplinary agencies, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and staffing for JIC functions.
EQUIPMENT	
6.2-E1	Communications/Alert and Warning Equipment.
6.2-E2	Public address systems and signage.
6.2-E3	Video teleconference equipment.
6.2-E4	Radio bank with recording capability.
6.2-E5	Televisions with recording capability.
TRAINING	
6.2-T1	Ensure relevant public information staff are trained on public information, alert/warning, and notification policy and procedures.
6.2-T2	Ensure relevant public information staff trained on public information, alert/warning, and notification equipment.

6.2-T3	Ensure potential spokespersons identified to provide information during an emergency have been trained in the principles of Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC).
EXERCISES	
6.2-Ex1	Incorporate public information and warning function as part of multi-discipline response operations exercises.

Objective 6.3 Strengthen Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place Capabilities

Citizen evacuation and shelter-in-place is the capability to prepare for, ensure communication of, and immediately execute the safe and effective sheltering-in-place of an at-risk population (and companion animals), and/or the organized and managed evacuation of the at-risk population (and companion animals) to areas of safe refuge in response to a potentially or actually dangerous environment. In addition, this capability involves the safe reentry of the population where feasible.

Objective 6.3 Outcome

Affected and at-risk populations, to include access and functional needs populations, in the Bay Area (and companion animals to the extent necessary to save human lives) are safely sheltered-in-place or evacuated to safe refuge areas and eventually returned home when safe and feasible.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
6.3-P1	Update, as needed, the Bay Area Regional Catastrophic Earthquake Mass Transportation/Evacuation Plan.
6.3-P2	Develop plans and procedures for evacuation/shelter-in place of access and functional needs populations.
6.3-P3	Develop plans and procedures for sheltering in place during a CBRNE event.
6.3-P4	Develop plans and procedures for evacuation/shelter-in place companion animals.
ORGANIZATION	
6.3-O1	Develop and distribute public education materials on evacuation/shelter-in-place preparation, plans, and procedures for natural hazards and CBRNE events.
6.3-O2	Pre-arrange contracts and agreements to ensure provision of transportation vehicles and drivers during an incident requiring mass evacuations.

EQUIPMENT	
6.3-E1	Traffic control equipment (barriers, cones, directional signals).
TRAINING	
6.3-T1	Provide training on the implementation of the Bay Area Regional Catastrophic Earthquake Mass Transportation/Evacuation Plan.
6.3-T2	Develop and implement programs to train local citizens on evacuation, reentry and shelter-in place processes.
EXERCISES	
6.3-Ex1	Conduct exercises to test and evaluate the Bay Area Regional Catastrophic Earthquake Mass Transportation/Evacuation Plan.

Objective 6.4 Improve Mass Care

Mass Care is the capability to provide immediate shelter, feeding centers, basic first aid, bulk distribution of needed items, and related services to persons affected by a large-scale incident.

Objective 6.4 Outcome

Mass care services, including sheltering, feeding, and bulk distribution, are rapidly, effectively and efficiently provided for the population, including those with access and functional needs, and companion animals for those impacted by the incident.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
6.4-P1	Update, as needed, the Regional Catastrophic Mass Care and Sheltering Plan.
6.4-P2	Develop plans and procedures for mass care involving a CBRNE incident.
6.4-P3	Develop mass care plans that integrate and account for those individuals and families with access and functional needs.
ORGANIZATION	
6.4-O1	Develop pre-designated vendor agreements, MOUs, blanket purchase agreements, or MOAs for critical mass care resources (such as pre-packaged meals ready to eat and ice).
6.4-O2	Develop public education materials concerning mass care services.
6.4-O3	Conduct an inventory of available shelter space for people and companion animals.

EQUIPMENT	
6.4-E1	Acquire, sustain and store directly or through partners mass care equipment such as cots (standard and accessible), blankets, feeding equipment (e.g., food storage containers), food and beverages, first-aid supplies, and animal supplies, etc.
TRAINING	
6.4-T1	Provide mass care training to include a focus on those with access and functional needs.
EXERCISES	
6.4-Ex1	Conduct exercises to test and evaluate the implementation of the Regional Catastrophic Mass Care and Sheltering Plan.

Objective 6.5 Increase Community Preparedness and Participation

The Community Preparedness and Participation capability provides that all necessary personnel in the community are aware, trained, and/or practiced on how to prevent, protect/mitigate, prepare for, and respond to all threats and hazards the community may face.

Objective 6.5 Outcome

There is a formal structure and a process in place across the Bay Area region for ongoing collaboration between government and nongovernmental resources at all levels to prevent, protect/mitigate, prepare for, respond to and recover from all threats and hazards.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
6.5-P1	Ensure CERT Teams are integrated into ICS/NIMS/SEMS.
ORGANIZATION	
6.5-O1	Establish regional citizen educational programs on personal protective measures, disaster kits and communications plans that can be implemented locally.
6.5-O2	Develop regional public awareness and preparedness campaigns and education materials for access and functional needs populations that can be implemented locally.
EQUIPMENT	
6.5-E1	Provide and sustain CERT teams with necessary equipment.

TRAINING	
6.5-T1	Train the public, with an emphasis on citizen corps volunteers, to be aware and to report suspicious items, smells and behavior to local law enforcement (with follow-on reporting by law enforcement to the regional fusion center for analysis).
6.5-T2	Conduct CERT Team training on integration with first responders through ICS/NIMS/SEMS.
EXERCISES	
6.5-Ex1	Implement an exercise and evaluation process to assess citizen preparedness programs through specific exercises or as part of larger overall exercise
6.5-Ex2	Conduct regional exercises to test CERT regional capabilities.

Objective 6.6 Enhance Volunteer Management and Donations

Volunteer Management and Donations is the capability to effectively coordinate the use of volunteers and donations in support of incident management.

Objective 6.6 Outcome

Volunteers and donations within the Bay Area are organized and managed in coordination with Cal Volunteers when necessary, throughout an emergency or disaster based upon pre-designated plans, procedures and systems ensuring that the positive effect of using volunteers and donations is maximized to augment disaster operations.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
6.6-P1	Update, as needed, the Regional Catastrophic Donations Management Plan.
6.6-P2	Develop plans and procedures to improve local government and volunteer organizations' ability to recruit, screen, credential and manage both pre-affiliated and spontaneous volunteers.
ORGANIZATION	
6.6-O1	Provide standardized outreach to local jurisdictions in multiple languages, increasing the ability to effectively utilize all volunteers as necessary.
EQUIPMENT	
6.6-E1	Acquire and sustain volunteer management tracking systems that are interoperable across the Bay Area. Ensure systems can manage spontaneous volunteers as well as on-call volunteers that can support a variety of capability and mission needs during and after a disaster.

TRAINING	
6.6-T1	Provide training on the implementation of the Regional Catastrophic Donations Management Plan.
6.6-T2	Develop just-in-time training program for volunteers to perform required tasks.
EXERCISES	
6.6-Ex1	Conduct exercises on the implementation of the Regional Catastrophic Donations Management Plan.

GOAL 7	Mission Area(s)	National Priorities	Target Capabilities	State Strategy
ENHANCE RECOVERY CAPABILITIES	Recovery	N/A	Structural Damage Assessment Economic and Community Recovery Environmental Health Restoration of Lifelines	Goal 7: Enhance Recovery Capabilities

The National Recovery Framework

Given the risk of a major disaster occurring in the Bay Area, it is essential for the region to establish both short-term and long-term recovery capabilities. Building recovery capabilities has for some time been a neglected element of homeland security and emergency preparedness. To help address this gap, in September 2011, DHS released the final National Disaster Recovery Framework. The NDRF defines how Federal agencies will organize and operate to utilize existing resources to promote effective recovery and support states, tribes and other jurisdictions affected by a disaster.

The NDRF seeks to define:

- Roles and responsibilities of the newly-proposed recovery coordinators and other stakeholders;
- A coordinating structure, which includes proposed Recovery Support Functions, that facilitates communication and collaboration among all stakeholders;
- Guidance for pre- and post-disaster recovery planning; and
- The overall process by which, together as a nation, we can capitalize on opportunities to rebuild stronger, smarter, and safer communities.

The NDRF compliments and aligns with the National Response Framework (NRF) and utilizes an operational structure to develop a common recovery framework in a manner similar to how the NRF establishes a common response framework. The NDRF replaces the NRF Emergency Support Function #14 (ESF #14) - Long-Term Community Recovery with six Recovery Support functions (RSFs):

- Community Planning and Capacity Building.
- Economic.
- Health and Social Services.
- Housing.
- Infrastructure Systems.
- Natural and Cultural Resources

The Bay Area will utilize the NDRF as a guide for developing its own recovery framework in coordination with the State of California and the Federal Government. In doing so, certain key principles will guide the development of the regional recovery framework:

- Critical to recovery preparedness is pre-disaster planning, an ongoing responsibility for all levels of governments; individuals and families; the business community; and voluntary, faith-based and community organizations.
- Local governments have primary responsibility for disaster recovery in their community and play the lead role in planning for and managing all aspects of community recovery.
- Partnerships and inclusiveness between local businesses; owners and operators of critical infrastructure and key resources; and voluntary, faith-based, and community organizations are vital.

The Bay Area has significant experience in this area and will build upon that experience to ensure that essential functions from initial damage assessment to housing to economic and community restoration takes place as quickly and as smoothly as possible.

Finally, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and the CI/KR Annex to the NRF provide a bridge between steady-state CI/KR protection and resilience programs and incident response. The NDRF links both documents and their related protection and response missions to the recovery mission area. As the Bay Area develops its own recovery framework, it will ensure integration with its CI/KR protection and incident response programs where applicable.

Objective 7.1 Strengthen Structural Damage Assessment Capabilities

Structural damage assessment is the capability to conduct damage and safety assessments of infrastructure and to perform structural inspections, and mitigation activities. The capability includes being able to provide contractor management, construction management, cost estimating, technical assistance, and other engineering services to support and manage recovery operations.

Objective 7.1 Outcome

The Bay Area can provide accurate situation needs and damage assessments. The full range of engineering, building inspection, and code enforcement services are implemented, managed, and coordinated in a way that maximizes the use of resources, aids emergency response, implements recovery operations, and restores the affected area to pre-event conditions.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
7.1-P1	Provide assessments, inventories and planning recommendations to mitigate seismic risks in the Bay Area by completing an assessment and inventory of soft story construction in the Bay Area.
7.1-P2	Ensure damage assessment protocols and procedures in the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan are kept up to date.

ORGANIZATION	
7.1-O1	Consistent with the Regional Volunteer Management Plan, develop plans and procedures to recruit volunteers to join assessment teams and conduct structural damage assessments post disasters.
7.1-O2	In coordination with the State sponsored Metrics Project, develop standards and procedures, to include a database to identify qualified contractors offering recovery/restoration services and equipment across the Bay Area.
7.1-O3	Develop qualification and certification standards for paid and volunteer staff.
7.1-O4	Develop and maintain disaster assessment teams per NIMS - Type I, II, and/or III Disaster Assessment Teams, and Engineering Service Teams.
EQUIPMENT	
7.1-E1	Acquire and sustain technology and systems that can predict the effects of a specific incident or hazard, including estimated damage to the region's transportation system, type, amount and location of debris, and number of buildings severely or completely damaged.
7.1-E2	Acquire, sustain and inventory personal protective equipment for recovery damage assessment teams. Deploy caches of equipment outside danger zones if necessary.
7.1-E3	Acquire and sustain damage assessment data collection system (hardware and software).
TRAINING	
7.1-T1	Provide training to volunteers and paid personnel on damage assessment procedures, plans and equipment.
EXERCISES	
7.1-Ex1	Ensure damage assessment procedures and mitigation plans and procedures are exercised independently or as part of a regional exercise.

Objective 7.2 Enable Economic and Community Recovery

Economic and Community Recovery is the capability to implement short- and long-term recovery and mitigation processes after an incident. This will include identifying the extent of damage caused by an incident, conducting thorough post-event assessments and determining and providing the support needed for recovery and restoration activities to minimize future loss from a similar event.

Objective 7.2 Outcome

Across the Bay Area, economic impact is estimated; priorities are set for recovery activities; business disruption is minimized; and individuals and families are provided with appropriate levels and types of relief with minimal delay.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
7.2-P1	Develop Regional Recovery Support Function (RSF) or equivalent recovery framework that addresses housing, economic, environmental, infrastructure, and health and social service needs.
7.2-P2	Update, as needed, the Regional Catastrophic Interim Housing Plan.
ORGANIZATION	
7.2-O1	Identify responsibilities for the position of a Regional Disaster Recovery Coordinator (RDRC) or equivalent, and resources for regional recovery support functions.
TRAINING	
7.2-T1	Develop and implement recovery training and education as a tool for building recovery capacity and making it available to all other stakeholders.
7.2-T2	Provide training on the implementation of the Regional Catastrophic Interim Housing Plan.
EXERCISES	
7.2-Ex1	Exercise stabilization and recovery plans to include the Regional Catastrophic Earthquake Interim Housing Plan through specific exercises or as part of larger overall regional exercise.

Objective 7.3 Improve Environmental Health Capabilities

Environmental Health is the capability to protect the public from environmental hazards and manage the health effects of an environmental health emergency on the public. The capability minimizes human exposures to environmental public health hazards (e.g., contaminated food, air, water, solid waste/debris, hazardous waste, vegetation, sediments, and vectors).

Objective 7.3 Outcome

After the primary event, disease and injury are prevented across the Bay Area through the quick identification of associated environmental hazards, including debris and hazardous waste, exposure to infectious diseases that are secondary to the primary event as well as secondary transmission modes.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements

PLANNING	
7.3-P1	Update, as needed, the Regional Catastrophic Debris Removal Plan.
7.3-P2	Develop plans to enhance capacity of sewage treatment facilities for major disasters.
7.3-P3	Pre-identify potential routes for debris removal and debris management.
7.3-P4	Develop debris removal and debris management annexes to EOPs where necessary.
TRAINING	
7.3-T1	Provide training on environmental health to pre-designated managers, responders, and volunteers of mass-care operations.
7.3-T2	Provide training to environmental health strike teams.
7.3-T3	Develop and conduct emergency response training relevant to all waste water systems including field staff and managers of waste water programs, waste water utilities, public health, and emergency management.
EXERCISES	
7.3-Ex1	Conduct, or include as part of broader exercises, tests and evaluations of environmental health teams in the region.
7.3-Ex2	Conduct, or include as part of broader exercises, tests of waste water sewage facilities' capacity.

Objective 7.4 Enhance Restoration of Lifelines Capabilities

Restoration of Lifelines is the capability to facilitate the repair/replacement of infrastructure for oil, gas, electric, telecommunications, drinking water, wastewater, and transportation services during and after a disaster.

Objective 7.4 Outcome

Activities between lifeline operations and government operations in the Bay Area are coordinated with a process for getting the appropriate personnel and equipment to the disaster scene so that lifelines can begin sustainable emergency response and recovery activities.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements


PLANNING	
7.4-P1	In coordination with the State, conduct infrastructure intersection/interdependency analysis and work plans for guiding mitigation projects, response priorities and post-disaster recovery actions within operational areas and across the region.
7.4-P2	Continue to utilize the San Francisco Lifelines Restoration Project as a foundation for regional lifelines restoration planning.
EQUIPMENT	
7.4-E1	Acquire and sustain back-up generators for short term restoration of lifelines.
TRAINING	
7.4-T1	Provide training to government entities on the restoration of lifelines process.
EXERCISES	
7.4-Ex1	Coordinate with other lifelines companies/sectors to create cross-sector exercises to test restoration plans.

GOAL 8	Mission Area(s)	National Priorities	Target Capabilities	State Strategy
ENHANCE HOMELAND SECURITY EXERCISE, EVALUATION AND TRAINING PROGRAMS	All	All	All	Goal 9: Enhance Homeland Security Exercise, Evaluation and Training Programs

Bay Area Training and Exercise Model

The Bay Area's multi-year Homeland Security Exercise, Evaluation and Training Program is designed to address regional goals, build towards and test against target capabilities within this Strategy, and improve the operational readiness of the homeland security system in the Bay Area across the full spectrum of prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery.

The training and exercise goal is primarily focused on developing a system and framework to implement the training and exercise needs identified in the other objectives within the Strategy.



The figure above reinforces the Bay Area planning process chart by demonstrating once again the cyclical nature of the risk management and planning process and how Goals 1 and 8 play an overarching role in this process by first identifying the priority risks faced by the Bay Area jurisdictions, and the priority capabilities needed to address those risks. This is followed by constructing the exercise and evaluation means to determine if those priority capabilities are being enhanced through the implementation steps within each of the objectives throughout the Strategy.

Training and exercises provide the means to enhance, test, and evaluate the Bay Area's proficiency in homeland security generally and the priority capabilities in particular. Exercises, as discussed in the Strategy Evaluation Section, are a critical means of determining whether the Bay Area is actually enhancing those priority capabilities designed to reduce the region's risk. Any assessment program must include a robust exercise and evaluation element to ensure data from simulated incidents are integrated with self-assessment data, and of course, real-world incident data collected both during and after the incident when available. Such a process will put the Bay Area in the best possible position to understand whether it is truly enhancing capabilities and overall preparedness.

Training and Exercises Plans and Procedures

In 2008, the Bay Area produced a Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan for law enforcement, fire and EMS, which provides a roadmap to follow in accomplishing regional priorities for those three disciplines. The core findings of that report, as they relate to exercises, are incorporated within this strategic goal. A revised regional Training and Exercise Plan is scheduled to be complete by 2012.

On April 22, 2011, the Bay Area UASI Approval Authority agreed to have the Alameda County Sheriff's Office be the Bay Area's Training and Exercise program manager and provider for Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011. On July 15, 2011, the MOU between the Bay Area and Alameda County was signed by all parties and put into effect.

Exercises conducted at all jurisdictional levels within the Bay Area – local, operational area, full region - should follow the planning, training, exercise, and improvement plan cycle. As the cycle indicates, it is recommended that jurisdictions accomplish the following specific planning steps prior to conducting an exercise:

- Assess current operations plans for completeness and relevance
- Assess the current level of training and operational plan familiarity for all relevant agencies within the jurisdiction
- Conduct necessary training for all relevant agencies
- Train personnel on newly received equipment
- Conduct exercises using equipment, training, and operations plans
- Develop an After Action Report (AAR) that captures the lessons learned.

The exercise progression for each jurisdiction is to move from a seminar to a table top, to a functional exercise, and finally, to a full scale exercise. These particular exercise types allow for a logical progression of regional and jurisdictional preparedness by increasing in size, complexity, and stress factor, while allowing for significant learning opportunities that effectively complement, build upon, and directly lead into one another. This model is flexible enough to allow for the addition of other desired exercise types.

The Bay Area's Urban Shield Exercise

Urban Shield is a national model, full-scale exercise, designed to assess and validate the speed, effectiveness and efficiency of capabilities, as well as test the adequacy of regional policies, plans, procedures and protocols. Urban Shield incorporates regional critical infrastructure, emergency operation centers, regional communication systems, equipment and assets, as well as personnel representing all aspects of emergency response including intelligence, law enforcement, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units, Fire, EMS, etc. The Urban Shield Exercise is unique because of its focus on training during the exercise. This training provides first responders, homeland security officials, emergency management officials, private and non-governmental partners, and other personnel with the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to perform key tasks required in large-scale disasters.

Objective 8.1: Develop a Regional Exercise and Evaluation Program

The Bay Area will develop a regional exercise and evaluation program that ensure that the region tests and evaluates its capabilities across the five mission areas of homeland security in a unified and structured way. The Bay Area's jurisdictions possess differing levels of preparedness regarding terrorism prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery capabilities. Because of these differences, the Bay Area exercise and evaluation program will use a building-block approach in the design of the overall exercise program. This building-block approach ensures successful progression in exercise design, complexity, and execution, and allows for the appropriate training and preparation to take place in the jurisdiction or area conducting the exercise.

Objective 8.1 Outcome

The Bay Area has a regional exercise program that tests and evaluates whether the region has enhanced and/or maintained the right level of capability based on the risks faced by the region and the evaluation process feeds identified capability gaps and strengths directly into the region's risk management and planning process for remediation or sustainment.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements:

PLANNING	
8.1-P1	Develop and maintain a comprehensive regional exercise plan and program for the development and conduct of exercises based on risk and capability needs that cover the spectrum of prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery mission areas.
8.1-P2	Coordinate with local jurisdictions to incorporate locally driven needs into the regional exercise plan.
8.1-P3	Collaborate with local jurisdictions to develop regional exercise goals to meet multiple exercise requirements and foster participation in regional exercises.
8.1-P4	Coordinate regional exercises with State driven exercises (Golden Guardian) to reduce duplication of effort.
8.1-P5	Design After Action Reports and improvement plans that are built from capability targets and capture capability proficiencies and gaps that can be readily assessed and quantified for planning purposes.
8.1-P6	Host agency of major exercise(s) should reconvene participants to review key findings to ensure lessons learned are identified and taken back to all involved agencies.
8.1-P7	The exercise program management office will evaluate the feasibility of developing a regional exercise calendar.

8.1-P8	The exercise program management office will review HSEEP portal for trends on best practices and lessons learned and report this information to the Training and Exercise Committee on an as needed basis.
EQUIPMENT	
8.1-E2	Procure authorized and necessary equipment to conduct exercises.
TRAINING	
8.1-T1	Train exercise planning and evaluation staff at the regional and jurisdictional levels on exercise design, management and evaluation procedures.
EXERCISES	
8.1-Ex1	Develop at least one, regional multi-disciplinary full-scale exercise consistent with the identified theme of the annual statewide exercise and run the exercise at multiple locations with multiple partners in the region.
8.1-Ex2	Conduct multiple exercises at the sub-regional and jurisdictional level annually.

Objective 8.2 Develop Regional Training Program

The Bay Area will develop and maintain a regional training program that covers all public safety, health and medical agencies and support entities. The program will be managed by an executive agent/program manager. The executive agent/program manager will oversee, either directly or through separate contracts, all training for the region and will manage all training reimbursements from other member jurisdictions and manage the overall program for the entire Bay Area. The purpose is to build a training program that unifies all jurisdictions within the Bay Area toward a common set of goals while recognizing that each jurisdiction and discipline will have differing levels of capabilities and training needs.

Objective 8.2 Outcome

The Bay Area has a multi-discipline multi-jurisdictional risk and capabilities based training program that enhances and sustains priority capabilities in order to mitigate the region's most pressing risks.

Implementation Steps and Resource Elements:

PLANNING	
8.2-P1	Develop and maintain a comprehensive regional training plan and program for the development and conduct of training based on risk and capability needs that cover the spectrum of prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery mission areas.
EQUIPMENT	
8.2-E1	Materials and supplies, reproduction of materials, and such other equipment needed to conduct the training and support the training program.
8.2-E2	Tools and systems to document and manage training programs.
TRAINING	
8.2-T1	Implement training to all disciplines based on the regional training program.

SECTION 8

STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION

8.1 Overview

With the development and update of the Strategy, the Bay Area must have a comprehensive implementation process to ensure the data and priorities encapsulated in the Strategy actually drive the region's policies, structures, projects and investments. This requires assigned roles and responsibilities and a process and tools that link the Bay Area's investments back to the Strategy's goals and objectives.

The Bay Area UASI Management Team will have overall responsibility for managing and tracking implementation of the Strategy with the UASI Management Team's Director of Strategy and Grant Compliance serving as the executive agent for that function. This will include day-to-day management of the Strategy and ensuring that it is updated and followed. This will be done through the development of investment justifications and annual reporting (discussed in the following section).

8.2 Sustainment

In FY 2011, the DHS grant programs incurred significant budget cuts. The UASI program in particular saw a 19% cut from FY 2010 levels with the SHSP receiving a 35% cut with the Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant program eliminated outright. The federal budget for FY 2012 is under even greater pressure to incur cuts, and grants to states and localities have been targeted for cuts that could eliminate numerous other programs. Coupled with tight local and state budgets, the need to develop a sustainment policy for the capabilities already developed in the Bay Area is vital.

While the Bay Area Strategy is not a grant strategy, grants do play a vital role in building and sustaining the regional capabilities called for in the Strategy. As grant funds are depleted, sustainment will raise numerous critical issues for the region. In order to engage in a meaningful sustainment analysis, the Bay Area region must first prioritize those capability enhancements achieved thus far and then understand the costs associated with sustaining those capabilities. One method the region can explore is the life-cycle cost methodology, which calculates the 'total' cost of owning an asset or resource over its lifetime.

8.3 Investment Justifications

The purpose of submitting investment justifications to DHS is to obtain grant funding necessary to implement the goals and objectives of this Strategy. Investment justifications that fall outside the goals and objectives of this Strategy will not be submitted. In addition, funding received from other sources related to homeland security may be leveraged in accordance with the goals and objectives of this Strategy.

The investment justification process must be viewed as the culmination of a comprehensive homeland security planning and implementation process and not simply as a ninety-day

application writing event in order to ask for money from the Federal government. This process requires specific steps and management in order to ensure the region as a whole presents a unified investment picture to DHS and the State of California. As such, the Strategy outlines, at a high level, those steps that, at a minimum, must be taken in order to ensure the regions operates efficiently and effectively in the planning and investment process.

8.4 Strategy Implementation Process

While the specific details concerning the Strategy's implementation process may vary from year to year, certain fundamentals will be followed to ensure the region is achieving and tracking its homeland security goals and objectives. For the Bay Area, given its size and diversity, the process will involve a combination of jurisdictional, sub-regional and region-wide efforts and responsibilities.

8.4.1 Strategy Implementation Guidance

For each fiscal year, the UASI Management Team will develop specific strategy implementation guidance for working groups and applicants to follow during each investment justification cycle relative to the UASI grant program. This will include planning timelines, investment strategies and priorities for a given grant cycle, grant guidance to include funding allocation formulas and allowable spending areas, project templates, and such other materials and policies as necessary.

With each passing year, Congress and DHS are demanding more specificity from Urban Areas and States on how homeland security grants are impacting security and preparedness across the nation. For the Bay Area, the use of the Target Capabilities List in helping design each goal and objective is based, in part, on aligning projects to capabilities, which will in turn help the region align dollars to capabilities. As the Target Capabilities phase out and the Core Capabilities take precedence, the Bay Area will look to update its Strategy to better align with this new capability taxonomy under the National Preparedness Goal.

8.4.2 Project Template

For the UASI grant cycle, and as part of the implementation guidance, the UASI Management Team will develop a project template to be used by applicants to outline proposed projects. The template will be designed to link projects to the Bay Area Strategy by requiring applicants to link to the goals, objectives and implementation steps, including POETE elements, within the Strategy. It is through the project templates that the Bay Area will first link dollars to objectives and in turn link capabilities to dollars to help better answer where and how the region is better prepared.

8.4.3 Role of the Work Groups

The General Manager for the Bay Area UASI shall establish work groups to serve as the lead entity for each goal in the Strategy. The lead entity will be responsible for initially vetting projects to ensure they comply with the Strategy and the implementation guidance for a particular year. Work groups may also develop their own region-wide projects consistent with the Strategy. The exact vetting process shall be left up to the General Manager and each lead entity/work group. However, the project template designed by the Bay Area UASI Management

Team will be a primary tool with which to vet such proposed projects by the work groups. Only upon vetting by the Bay Area UASI Management to ensure compliance with grant guidelines and UASI policy or the work group shall a project be put forward for final approval by the Approval Authority to implement a specific goal and objective(s) in the Strategy.

With support from the Management Team, the entities or work groups responsible for overseeing the implementation of the goals and objectives in the Strategy will work with project managers and others to track whether an implementation step within each objective is complete, partially complete or ongoing and report this information to the Advisory Group and Approval Authority as necessary. A complete step is one that is finished and requires no additional resources for implementation. A partially complete step is one where some, but not all, of the step is finished and requires additional resources for completion. An ongoing step is one that may be finished insofar as the plan has been written or the equipment has been purchased but where additional resources are need for sustainment.

SECTION 9

STRATEGY EVALUATION

9.1 Evaluation Overview

In order to truly understand what value the Bay Area is getting for its homeland security investments, the region must have a consistent mechanism by which to measure the effectiveness of the homeland security activities – plans developed, personnel hired, organization and operations conducted, equipment purchased, number of people trained, and exercises conducted – generated through those investments.

In 2011, the Bay Area conducted a preliminary analysis of UASI grant effectiveness. The report qualitatively and quantitatively documented progress made by the Bay Area in building capabilities, reducing risk, and enhancing regional preparedness through investments that support the goals and objectives in the Bay Area Homeland Security Strategy, which aligns with the National Preparedness Guidelines and supports the implementation of the State of California Homeland Security Strategy and the National Security Strategy. The report serves as a baseline for future assessments and evaluations of how the region is implementing its Strategy and the effectiveness of the grant programs and other funding sources utilized to do so.

9.2 The Evaluation Process

The long-term goal for the Bay Area is to build a process and tools in order to qualitatively and quantitatively document progress made by the Bay Area in building capabilities, reducing risk, and enhancing regional preparedness based on implementing the goals and objectives outlined in the *Bay Area Homeland Security Strategy*. The result will be the *Bay Area Preparedness Report*.

Where the *Bay Area Homeland Security Strategy* presents what the region needs to achieve or sustain in homeland security, the *Bay Area Preparedness Report* presents what the region has actually accomplished in the area of homeland security as a result of investments called for in the Strategy from different sources, including local budgets, state budgets, and grants.

Built into each goal and objective in this Strategy is a previously conducted risk and capabilities assessment and gap analysis which helped prioritize each goal and objective and identify gaps in each capability. To measure the implementation of the Strategy, the Bay Area will evaluate each goal and its related objectives based upon the following high level evaluation guidelines the implementation of which shall be developed and coordinated by the UASI Management Team:

- Update the outcome for each objective in the Strategy. This outcome will set the agreed upon broad and overall target level of capability upon which evaluation for each objective will be based.
- Develop Bay Area specific performance measures and targets based on the TCL/Core Capabilities List and NIMS/SEMS resource types as well as other resources. Both the TCL and the NIMS/SEMS have laid out critical tasks, performance measures, targets and standards for resources that can serve as useful indicators regarding the current level of

preparedness in a given capability area. However, they are not tailored to the specific needs of a given jurisdiction or region. Therefore, the Bay Area must define those targets, measures, and metrics specifically for the region and should do so according to the Core Capabilities or some combination of the TCL and Core Capabilities in the near future.

- Conduct the exercise and evaluation program. The Bay Area's HSEEP must be **designed upfront** to test whether target capability performance outcomes and related critical tasks are being achieved. Exercises should be designed around testing and evaluating the region's ability to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to and recover from the highest risk terrorism scenarios against the highest risk CI/KR across the region.
- Inventory investments and projects based on each capability. Each objective has a set of implementation steps broken out by POETE, which coincides with the funding solution areas allowed under most DHS grant programs. That data will be used directly against the performance measures to help determine increases in capability and better understand allocation of resources by capability.

9.3 Methods for Evaluation

Evaluating the implementation of this Strategy will be done in the form of measuring whether risk based capability needs are being implemented and tracked. Each objective in this Strategy has a set of outcomes in the form of performance objectives tied to it. Those outcomes will form the basis or capability target for measuring whether the region is on pace to achieving or maintaining that objective. It must be noted that each outcome in this Strategy is set at the UASI regional level and not at the jurisdictional level within the Bay Area UASI. Thus, each jurisdiction may have different outcomes based on jurisdictional level planning efforts that may be influenced by unique risk and need factors.

To date, there is no single agreed upon method to assess capabilities. Rather, there are a number of data sources and methodologies to help with this process each of which the Bay Area will utilize in the evaluation process:

- Self-Assessments
- Performance based assessments (real world and exercise events)
- Modeling and simulation

9.3.1 Self Assessments

Self-assessments are those where members of the Bay Area homeland security community convene to evaluate their capability levels based on a series of questions and defined metrics and measures. These assessments can cover a wide array of capabilities and public safety disciplines or be targeted to a specific capability or function (e.g., law enforcement). While useful, self-assessments are subjective and can be influenced by factors including the number and type of attendees at the assessment and the questions asked or not asked.

Self-assessments will most often involve workshops, interviews or webinars whereby subject matter expert participants will be asked a series of questions to get an understanding of how they

view their level of ability to perform a specific task or set of tasks during a given scenario. For example, SWAT or bomb squad team-based capability assessments can begin with audits of team equipment, supplies, and training records, as well as on site visits to interview team members to capture data.

The Bay Area has undergone several self-assessments over the last several years, most recently in 2009, 2010 again in 2011. In 2009, the Bay Area conducted a region-wide assessment whereby subject matter experts from across the region evaluated the region's level of ability within each of the 37 Target Capabilities. A similar assessment was conducted in 2010 with the difference being the assessment was broken out into four assessments. In 2011, a region wide assessment was once again conducted along with assessments at each of the 12 operational areas.

9.3.2 Performance Based Assessments

Performance-based assessments are most common in the form of exercises, although an ability to track and measure performance during a real world incident would provide the most accurate picture of capability. For the Bay Area, performance-based exercises should be based on testing the region's ability to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to and recover from the highest risk terrorism scenarios against the highest risk CI/KR as outlined in the risk overview section of the Strategy. The Bay Area's primary mechanism for performance based assessment is the Urban Shield Full Scale Exercise conducted annually.

Urban Shield tests the Bay Area's ability to manage numerous on-going critical incidents through the use of multiple incident commands. The critical incidents take place in a variety of venues over an extended period of time. The exercise requires full implementation of the components of the NIMS and SEMS. An Incident Command System (ICS) structure, with four Area Commands and a Department Operations Center are implemented to manage this extremely large exercise.

9.3.3. Modeling and Simulation Assessments

Quantitative capability models can be used to assist with planning and resource allocation, and to help determine capability gaps. Models can provide an independent baseline estimate of required levels of capability for a given jurisdiction or the region, based upon national averages, demographic information, and risk criteria. These models can use quantitative data to inform investment decisions by estimating the full lifecycle costs of achieving a given level of a capability, identifying capability gains from investments, and optimizing placement of new resources.

Appendix A

Bay Area UASI Planning Structure

